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a b s t r a c t
We define the algorithm ALBA for the language of the same distributive modal logic (DML)
for which a Sahlqvist theorem was proved by Gehrke, Nagahashi, and Venema. Successful
executions of ALBA compute the local first-order correspondents of input DML inequalities,
and also guarantee their canonicity. The class of inequalities on which ALBA is successful
is strictly larger than the newly introduced class of inductive inequalities, which in its turn
properly extends the Sahlqvist inequalities of Gehrke et al. Evidence is given to the effect
that, as their name suggests, inductive inequalities are the distributive counterparts of the
inductive formulas of Goranko and Vakarelov in the classical setting.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Sahlqvist theory: themodel-theoretic setting. Sahlqvist theory is among themost celebrated and useful results of the classical
theory of modal logic, and one of the hallmarks of its success. Traditionally developed in a model-theoretic setting (cf.
[21,26]), it provides an algorithmic, syntactic identification of a class of modal formulas whose associated normal modal
logics are strongly completewith respect to elementary (i.e. first-order definable) classes of frames. Thewhole theory consists
of two parts: canonicity and correspondence. The canonicity1 of a modal formula ϕ (or equivalently of the corresponding
identity ϕ ≈ ⊤) guarantees the strong completeness of Kϕ (i.e. the minimal normal modal logic containing ϕ) w.r.t. the
class F(ϕ) of frames defined by ϕ. The fact that ϕ corresponds to a first-order formula α (i.e. that for every frame F , F  ϕ
iff F  α) guarantees that F(ϕ) is elementary. Sahlqvist theory only provides sufficient but not necessary conditions for
canonicity and correspondence of modal formulas. In fact, it was shown [3] that the class of elementary modal formulas is
undecidable, so any class of elementary formulas described in purely syntactic terms can only be an approximation. Over
the years the ‘Sahlqvist class’ has been generalized and extended in various ways, including extensions within the basic
modal language like those to the inductive [18] and complex [25] classes, generalizations to extended modal languages such
as hybrid logic [24,5], and generalizations of the correspondence language to e.g. first-order logic with least fix-points [28].
‘Algorithmic approaches’ include the SQEMA algorithm introduced in [6], which properly covers all the inductive formulas.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address:wconradie@uj.ac.za (W. Conradie).
1 ϕ is canonical iff ϕ is valid on the canonical frame for Kϕ.
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Sahlqvist theory: the algebraic setting. Parallel to this line of investigation, Sahlqvist theory has also been developed in the
algebraic setting of canonical extensions. This was recognized to be useful both for simplifying proofs of existing results [19]
and for uniformly extending the theory itself from Boolean to distributive lattice-based logics [14]. Recent developments in
the theory of canonical extensions [10] have made available many aspects and benefits of the theory of relational semantics
for modal logics — including Sahlqvist theory — even to logics whose associated classes of algebras are based on lattices
that do not need to be distributive, such as substructural logics [23]. As observed already in [14], the algebraic approach
has the advantage of being modular in nature. This modular quality makes it possible, for instance, to prove canonicity
independently of correspondence (as is done, e.g., in [15]) and to explain the syntactic identification of the Sahlqvist fragment
in terms of favourable interaction between certain order-theoretic properties of the logical connectives/algebraic operations.
Interestingly, the order-theoretic properties that underlie the characterization of the Sahlqvist class remain inherently
unchanged when moving from the classical to more general settings.
Our contribution. In this paper, we define the algorithmALBA for the language of the same distributive modal logic (DML) for
which a Sahlqvist theorem was proved in [14]. Successful executions of ALBA compute the local first-order correspondents
of input DML inequalities, which are then shown to be canonical. Both in its design and in its performances, ALBA can
be regarded as the distributive counterpart of SQEMA: indeed ALBA’s core consists of two mutually dual versions of
the Ackermann lemma. The class of inequalities on which ALBA is successful is strictly larger than the class of inductive
inequalities, which we also define in this paper. In its turn, this class is strictly larger than the Sahlqvist inequalities of [14],
and evidence is given to the effect that, as their name suggests, inductive inequalities are the distributive counterparts of
inductive formulas in the classical setting [6].
The methodology. Our background framework is the dual equivalence between posets and perfect distributive lattices (cf.
Subsection 2.4), expanded so as to account for additional (modal) operations on the lattice side. This dualitymakes it possible
to present our algorithmic correspondence treatment in purely algebraic terms: for instance the proof of correctness ofALBA
is set in the complex algebras rather than in the frames.
The structure of the paper. In Section 2, we recall syntax, 2.1, and algebraic and frame semantics of distributive modal logic,
2.2, both discrete and topological, 2.3; we recall the notion of perfect distributive modal algebras (DMA’s) as the algebraic
duals of the frames for DML, 2.4, define the expanded language of perfect DMA’s, 2.5, and state the necessary facts for the
development of correspondence. In Section 3, we introduce the inductive inequalities, 3.1, recall the notion of Sahlqvist
inequalities, 3.2, show that inductive inequalities both project to the inductive formulas of [18] and semantically extend
the Sahlqvist inequalities, 3.3, and discuss the extensions of these classes to different signatures, 3.4. Section 3 does not
contain preliminaries, so the reader only interested in the algorithm can skip it. In Section 4 we state and prove the left and
right Ackermann’s lemmas for distributive modal logic. In Section 5 we give an informal presentation of how ALBA works,
by carrying out the reduction of an example. Then in Section 6 we proceed to give a formal description of ALBA. Section 7
presents examples of successful applications ofALBA to Sahlqvist, inductive and non-inductive inequalities. In Section 8, we
prove the correctness of ALBA, i.e. we show that whenever the reduction is successful, the output first-order formula locally
corresponds on DML frames to the input DML inequality. In Section 9, we give a uniform proof that every DML inequality
on which ALBA succeeds is canonical. In Section 10, we prove that ALBA succeeds on inductive inequalities. This, together
with the results in Sections 8 and 3, immediately implies that the Sahlqvist inequalities admit local correspondents, which
improves the correspondence result of [14]. Finally, the Appendix collects some of the technical facts on which the proof of
canonicity is based.
2. Distributive modal logic: the general framework
2.1. Syntax and axioms
Distributive modal logic (DML for short) was introduced in [14] as a basic modal formalism, closely related with e.g.
Dunn’s positive modal logic [9]. DML adds four unary modalities ✸,✷,✁,✄ to the propositional language of distributive
lattices. The intuitive meanings of ✸ϕ, ✷ϕ, ✁ϕ and ✄ϕ respectively are: ‘ϕ is possible, is necessary, might not be the case,
is impossible’. All of the four modalities can classically be syntactically defined in terms of just one of them (for instance,
✷ϕ ≡ ¬✸¬ϕ,✁ϕ ≡ ✸¬ϕ,✄ϕ ≡ ¬✸ϕ), but because of the absence of negation, this is no longer possible in the distributive
setting, so the four of themhave to be taken as primitive. And for the sake of generality, theywill be semantically interpreted
using four (different) accessibility relations. (The semantics will be given formally in the next subsection.)
Let PROP be a denumerably infinite set of propositional variables. The elements of PROP will be denoted with letters,
p, q, r , possibly indexed. The formulas ofLterm are given by the following recursive definition:
ϕ ::= ⊥ | ⊤ | p ∈ PROP | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ✸ϕ | ✷ϕ | ✁ϕ | ✄ϕ.
Typically, lattice-based logics of this kind are not expressive enough to allow an implication-like term to be defined out of
the primitive connectives. Therefore, the entailment relation cannot be recovered from the set of tautologies, and so the
deducibility has to be defined in terms of sequents. This motivates the following:
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Definition 2.1 (cf. [14, Def. 2.1]). A distributive modal logicΛ is a set of sequents ϕ ⇒ ψ with ϕ,ψ ∈ Lterm, which contains
the following sequents:
p ⇒ p ⊥ ⇒ p p ⇒ ⊤
p ⇒ p ∨ q q ⇒ p ∨ q p ∧ q ⇒ p p ∧ q ⇒ q
p ∧ (q ∨ r)⇒ (p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r)
✸(p ∨ q)⇒ ✸p ∨ ✸q ✸⊥ ⇒ ⊥ ✷p ∧ ✷q ⇒ ✷(p ∧ q) ⊤ ⇒ ✷⊤
✁(p ∧ q)⇒ ✁p ∨ ✁q ✁⊤ ⇒ ⊥ ✄p ∧ ✄q ⇒ ✄(p ∨ q) ⊤ ⇒ ✄⊥
and is closed under the following inference rules:
ϕ ⇒ δ δ ⇒ ψ
ϕ ⇒ ψ
ϕ ⇒ ψ
ϕ(δ/p)⇒ ψ(δ/p)
δ ⇒ ϕ δ ⇒ ψ
δ ⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ
ϕ ⇒ δ ψ ⇒ δ
ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ δ
ϕ ⇒ ψ
✸ϕ ⇒ ✸ψ
ϕ ⇒ ψ
✷ϕ ⇒ ✷ψ
ϕ ⇒ ψ
✁ψ ⇒ ✁ϕ
ϕ ⇒ ψ
✄ψ ⇒ ✄ϕ.
Recall that a quasi-identity is an expression of the form (ϕ1 = ψ1 & · · ·&ϕn = ψn) ⇒ ϕ = ψ , where the ϕ’s and ψ ’s
are terms. We will find it convenient to work with quasi-inequalities, i.e. expressions of the form (ϕ1 ≤ ψ1 & · · ·&ϕn ≤
ψn) ⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ , where the ϕ’s and ψ ’s are terms from Lterm. Of course, quasi-inequalities can be equivalently rewritten as
quasi-identities, by replacing e.g. ϕ ≤ ψ with ϕ ∧ ψ = ϕ. The sets of quasi-inequalities built from Lterm-inequalities will
beLquasi.
2.2. DM-algebras, DML frames, their complex algebras, and prime filter frames
Definition 2.2. A distributive modal algebra (DMA) (cf. [14, Def. 2.9]) is an algebra
A = (A,∨,∧,⊥,⊤,✸,✷,✁,✄)
such that (A,∨,∧,⊥,⊤) is a bounded distributive lattice and the additional operations satisfy the following identities:
✸(x ∨ y) = ✸x ∨ ✸y ✸⊥ = ⊥ ✷x ∧ ✷y = ✷(x ∧ y) ⊤ = ✷⊤
✁(x ∧ y) = ✁x ∨ ✁y ✁⊤ = ⊥ ✄x ∧ ✄y = ✄(x ∨ y) ⊤ = ✄⊥.
Themain difference between the distributive and the Boolean setting is that there are not enough ultrafilters to guarantee
that every proper filter of a distributive lattice is the intersection of all the ultrafilters extending it. However, every proper
filter of a distributive lattice is the intersection of all the prime filters extending it. This makes it possible to extend classical
constructions and results, like the Stone duality, to this setting. In particular, analogously to the case for the ultrafilter frame
of a BAO, every DMA A can be associated with its prime filter frame, whose points will be the prime filters of A. Unlike the
case for ultrafilters, which always form an antichain by definition, the inclusion ordering between prime filters is non-trivial,
and needs to be recorded in the associated frame. This explains why DML frames are based on posets, rather than on sets.
Given a poset (W ,≤), we will use the notation P ↑(W ) for the set of all up-sets2 of (W ,≤).
Definition 2.3 (DML Frame). A DML frame (cf. [14, Def. 2.4]) is a structure F = (W ,≤, R✸, R✷, R✁, R✄) such that (W ,≤)
is a nonempty poset, R✸, R✷, R✁, R✄ are binary relations onW and
≥ ◦ R✸ ◦ ≥ ⊆ R✸ ≤ ◦ R✄ ◦ ≥ ⊆ R✄
≤ ◦ R✷ ◦ ≤ ⊆ R✷ ≥ ◦ R✁ ◦ ≤ ⊆ R✁.
A model based on a DML frame F is a pairM = (F , V ), where V is a persistent valuation on F , i.e., a map V : PROP →
P ↑(W ), assigning an up-set to every propositional variable.
Given a modelM = (F , V ) based on a DML frame F = (W ,≤, R✸, R✷, R✁, R✄), and a state w ∈ W , the semantics of our
languageLterm is formally given by
M, w  ⊥, never
M, w  ⊤, always
M, w  p, iff w ∈ V (p)
M, w  ϕ ∨ ψ , iff M, w  ϕ orM, w  ψ
M, w  ϕ ∧ ψ , iff M, w  ϕ andM, w  ψ
M, w  ✸ϕ iff ∃v(wR✸v & M, v  ϕ)
M, w  ✷ϕ iff ∀v(wR✷v ⇒M, v  ϕ)
M, w  ✁ϕ iff ∃v(wR✁v & M, v ̸ ϕ)
M, w  ✄ϕ iff ∀v(wR✄v ⇒M, v ̸ ϕ).
2 For every poset (W ,≤), a subset X ⊆ W is an up-set (resp. down-set) if for all x, y ∈ W , if X ∋ x ≤ y (resp. X ∋ x ≥ y), then y ∈ X .
W. Conradie, A. Palmigiano / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (2012) 338–376 341
As usual, a formula ϕ is true on a model (denoted asM  ϕ) ifM, w  ϕ for every state w ∈ M; ϕ is valid at a state w in
the frame F (denoted as F , w  ϕ) if (F , V ), w  ϕ for every persistent valuation V on F ; ϕ is valid on F if it is valid at
every state in F .
Two formulas are semantically equivalent if they are true at the same states in models. They are said to be (locally) frame
equivalent if the are valid on the same (states in) frames.
For every modelM and every ϕ ∈ Lterm, [[ϕ]] denotes as usual the set of states at which ϕ is satisfied.
Definition 2.4 (Complex Algebra of a DML Frame). For every DML frame F = (W ,≤, R✸, R✷, R✁, R✄), the complex algebra
of F (cf. [14, Sec. 2.3]) is
F + = (P ↑(W ),∪,∩,∅,W , ⟨R✸⟩, [R✷], ⟨R✁], [R✄⟩),
where, for every X ⊆ W ,
[R✷]X := {w ∈ W | R✷[w] ⊆ X} = (R−1✷ [X c])c⟨R✸⟩X := {w ∈ W | R✸[w] ∩ X ≠ ∅} = R−1✸ [X][R✄⟩X := {w ∈ W | R✄[w] ⊆ X c} = (R−1✄ [X])c⟨R✁]X := {w ∈ W | R✁[w] ∩ X c ≠ ∅} = R−1✁ [X c].
Here (·)c denotes the complement relative toW , while R[x] = {w | w ∈ W and xRw} and R−1[x] = {w | w ∈ W andwRx}.
Moreover, R[X] ={R[x] | x ∈ X} and R−1[X] ={R−1[x] | x ∈ X}.
For each ⊙ ∈ {✸,✷,✁,✄}, let (R⊙) be the corresponding operation on subsets of W as defined above. The conditions
determining the interaction between≤ and R⊙ guarantee that (R⊙) is well defined onP ↑(W ), i.e., that, when applied to an
up-set, (R⊙) produces an up-set.3 Moreover, it is easy to see that (R⊙)[[ϕ]] = [[⊙ϕ]] for every ϕ ∈ Lterm and for every model
M. Hence, valuations V : PROP → P ↑(W ) can be identified with homomorphisms from the term algebra Lterm into the
complex algebra F +. We leave it to the reader to verify:
Proposition 2.5. For every DML frame F , F + is a DMA.
Definition 2.6. For every DMA A, the prime filter frame of A is
A• = (Pr(A),⊆, R✸, R✷, R✁, R✄),
where (Pr(A),⊆) is the poset of prime filters of A, and for every P,Q ∈ Pr(A),
PR✸Q iff Q ⊆ ✸−1[P] PR✷Q iff ✷−1[P] ⊆ Q
PR✁Q iff Q c ⊆ ✁−1[P] PR✄Q iff ✄−1[P] ⊆ Q c .
With this definition, it is straightforward to verify that
Proposition 2.7. For every DMA A, A• is a DML frame.
2.3. Descriptive general frames
Just like in the classical case, DML frames can be topologized so as to yield a category that can be shown to be dually
equivalent to the category of DMA’s and their homomorphisms. Just in the same way as the duality between BAO’s and
descriptive general frames is based on the Stone duality for Boolean algebras, the duality for DMA can be based on the
Priestley duality between bounded distributive lattices and Priestley spaces (which are defined in the Appendix). We are not
going to report on this duality, which is a slight generalization of the duality for positive modal logic given in [2], here; but
we will need the following:
Definition 2.8. A descriptive general frame is a structure G = (W ,≤, R✸, R✷, R✁, R✄, τ ) such that its underlying frame
G♯ = (W ,≤, R✸, R✷, R✁, R✄) is a DML frame, and moreover:
DG1. The structure XG = (W ,≤, τ ) is a Priestley space (see the Appendix), i.e., it is a compact and totally order-
disconnected ordered topological space.
DG2. For every⊙ ∈ {✷,✸,✄,✁} and every x ∈ W , R⊙[x] is τ -closed.
DG3. IfA is the collection of the clopen up-sets of XG, then A = (A,∪,∩,∅,W , ⟨R✸⟩, [R✷], ⟨R✁], [R✄⟩) is a subalgebra of
G+♯ .
A is the algebra of admissible sets of G. An admissible valuation on G is a valuation V : PROP → A sending propositional
variables to admissible sets.
We will sometimes refer to descriptive general frames as descriptive frames.
3 In fact, these conditions guarantee more: they guarantee that the restrictions of the adjoints of these maps are also well defined on P ↑(W ) (more in
Subsection 2.5).
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2.4. Perfect algebras and their correspondence with frames
In the Boolean setting, the complex algebras of Kripke frames are characterized in purely algebraic terms as perfect
BAO’s, whose Boolean reducts are complete atomic Boolean algebras. Perfect BAO’s are dually equivalent to Kripke frames:
in particular, their correspondence on objects is defined in one direction by associating a Kripke frame with its complex
algebra, and conversely by associating a perfect BAOAwith its atom structure, i.e. a Kripke framewhose states are the atoms
of A. These facts can all be extended to the DML setting: the complex algebras of DML frames are abstractly characterized
as perfect DMA’s. Before introducing them we need some preliminary definitions.
For every complete lattice C, an element c ∈ C \ {⊥} is completely join-irreducible iff c =  S implies c ∈ S for every
S ⊆ C; moreover, c is completely join-prime if, for every S ⊆ C, if c ≤  S, then c ≤ s for some s ∈ S. If c is completely
join-prime, then c is completely join-irreducible, and ifC is frame distributive (i.e. finite meets distribute over arbitrary joins
in each coordinate) then the completely join-irreducible elements are completely join-prime. The collection of completely
join-irreducible elements of C is denoted by J∞(C). The completely meet-irreducible/prime elements are defined order
dually, and the set that they form isM∞(C).
Definition 2.9. A complete lattice C is perfect (cf. [10, Def. 2.9]) if J∞(C) is join-dense in C andM∞(C) is meet-dense in C,
i.e. if for every u ∈ C, u ={r ∈ J∞(C) | r ≤ u} and u ={z ∈ M∞(C) | u ≤ z}.
A perfect distributive lattice is a perfect lattice that is also completely distributive (i.e. arbitrarymeets distribute over arbitrary
joins). Perfect distributive lattices are also characterized (cf. [14, Def. 2.14]) as those lattices that are isomorphic to the lattice
P ↑(X) for some poset X . A useful fact about any perfect distributive lattice C is that the map κ : J∞(C)→ M∞(C) defined
by j → {u ∈ C | j ≰ u} is an order isomorphism (cf. [14, Sec. 2.3]), when considering J∞(C) andM∞(C) as subposets of
C. The inverse of κ is λ : M∞(C) → J∞(C), given by the assignment m → {u ∈ C | u ≰ m}. From the definitions of κ
and λ it immediately follows that for every u ∈ C, every j ∈ J∞(C) and everym ∈ M∞(C),
j ≰ u iff u ≤ κ(j). (1)
u ≰ m iff λ(m) ≤ u. (2)
Definition 2.10 (Perfect DMA). (cf. [14, Def. 2.20]) A DMA A is perfect if its lattice reduct is a perfect distributive lattice and
for every S ⊆ A,
✸(

S) ={✸s | s ∈ S} ✷( S) ={✷s | s ∈ S}
✁(

S) ={✁s | s ∈ S} ✄( S) ={✄s | s ∈ S}.
It can be easily verified that
Proposition 2.11. For every DML frame F , F + is a perfect DMA.
The main difference between perfect DL’s and perfect BA’s is that, in general, the atoms of a perfect DL form a proper subset
of its completely join-prime elements and, moreover, there are generally not enough atoms to join-generate the perfect
DL. However, the definition of the atom structure of a perfect BAO can be extended to any perfect DMA C by basing the
frame on the poset (J∞(C),≥), where ≥ is the converse of the order that J∞(C) inherits from C. This definition restricts
naturally to the familiar definition in the Boolean setting: indeed, unlike the case for atoms, which always form an antichain
by definition, the lattice ordering between completely join-prime elements is non-trivial, and needs to be recorded in the
associated frame.
Definition 2.12 (cf. Atom Structures in [14, Sec. 2.3]). For every perfect DMAC, its associated prime structure is the following
frame:
C+ = (J∞(C),≥, R✸, R✷, R✁, R✄),
where (J∞(C),≥) is the dualized subposet of the completely join-prime elements of C, and for every i, j ∈ J∞(C),
jR✸i iff j ≤ ✸i jR✷i iff ✷κ(i) ≤ κ(j)
jR✁i iff j ≤ ✁κ(i) jR✄i iff ✄i ≤ κ(j).
Let us verify that C+ is indeed a DML frame. If j ≥C+ j′R✸i′ ≥C+ i, then, in C, by the monotonicity of ✸, we have
j ≤ j′ ≤ ✸i′ ≤ ✸i, which yields jR✸i. The remaining conditions can be verified similarly.
Proposition 2.13 (cf. [14, Prop. 2.25, 2.26]). For every perfect DMA C and every DML frame F ,
(C+)+ ∼= C and (F +)+ ∼= F .
The proposition above states that the same correspondence holds between perfect DMA’s and DML frames as between
perfect BAO’s andKripke frames.Wewill be able to prove our correspondence result in the setting of perfect DMA’s, precisely
because of this strong relationship with DML frames.
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2.5. The expanded language of perfect DMA’s
A crucial role for algebraic correspondence will be played by an expansion of the language of DML. This expansion is
meant to capture two aspects of the enhanced algebraic environment provided by perfect DMA’s, that will be described in
what follows.
The first aspect. It is well known (cf. [13]) that, for any complete lattice C, an n-ary map s : Cn → C is completely join-
preserving in its ith coordinate iff it has a right adjoint in that same coordinate, i.e. iff there exists a map t : Cn → C such
that, for all u1, . . . , un, v ∈ C,
s(u1, . . . , ui, . . . , un) ≤ v iff ui ≤ t(u1, . . . , v, . . . , un).
Order-dually, t : Cn → C is completely meet-preserving in its ith coordinate iff it has a left adjoint in that coordinate, i.e.
iff there exists a map s : Cn → C such that the clause above is satisfied for all u1, . . . , un, v ∈ C. Moreover, if s and t form
an adjoint pair in their ith coordinate, then s is order-preserving in its jth coordinate iff t is order-reversing in that same
coordinate, for every j ≠ i.
Since any perfect DMA is a complete lattice, and, by definition, each operation of a perfect DMA (including ∧ and ∨) is
either completely join- ormeet-preserving or join- ormeet-reversing in each coordinate4 (see the second table below), then
each operation of a perfect DMA has a coordinatewise adjoint, or residual, introduced in the table below.5 Each operation in
the lower row is the (coordinatewise) adjoint of the corresponding operation in the upper row:
∧ ∨ ✸ ✷ ✁ ✄
→ −  _ J I
The choice of notation for each new operation is by nomeans a random one:→ being the right residual of∧ and− being
the left residual of ∨ respectively mean that for every u, v, w ∈ C,
u ∧ v ≤ w iff u ≤ v → w and u− v ≤ w iff u ≤ v ∨ w.
Hence,→ is the Heyting implication,− is the Heyting implication of the dual latticeC∂ , and every perfect distributive lattice
is the lattice reduct of a complete (bi-)Heyting algebra. Moreover, onemember of an adjoint pair completely determines the
other: for instance for every u, v ∈ C,
u → v =

{w : u ∧ w ≤ v} u− v =

{w : u ≤ v ∨ w},
so in a powerset algebra, the operation− is then the relative complementation. As for the remaining operations, for every
u, v ∈ C,
✸u ≤ v iff u ≤ v u ≤ ✷v iff _u ≤ v
✁u ≤ v iff Jv ≤ u u ≤ ✄v iff v ≤ Iu,
and hence, the right adjoint of✸ is completely meet-preserving, i.e. it is a ‘box’, the right adjoint of✁ turns meets into joins,
i.e. it is a ‘left triangle’, and so on. Summing up:
Complete operators ∧ : C× C→ C ✸ : C→ C ✁ : C∂ → C
Right adjoints →: C∂ × C→ C  : C→ C J : C→ C∂
Complete dual operators ∨ : C× C→ C ✷ : C→ C ✄ : C∂ → C
Left adjoints − : C× C∂ → C _ : C→ C I : C→ C∂
The second aspect. In a perfect DMA C, the poset J∞(C) plays the same crucial role as the set of atoms in a perfect BAO:
its elements join-generate C and form the set of states of the associated prime structure C+. Order dually, M∞(C) meet-
generates C and its elements can be thought of as the co-states of C+. In the distributive setting that we are in, bringing the
completely meet-prime elements explicitly into the account is not essential, for, as we remarked earlier, M∞(C) is order-
isomorphic to J∞(C); however their presence makes the treatment of correspondence much smoother, and allows for a
more natural generalization to the setting of non-distributive lattices, where their role is essential.
The expanded language of perfect DMA’s will include the connectives corresponding to all the adjoint operations, as well
as a denumerably infinite set of sorted variables NOM called nominals, ranging over the completely join-prime elements of
perfect DMA’s, and a denumerably infinite set of sorted variables CO-NOM, called co-nominals,6 ranging over the completely
meet-prime elements of perfect DMA’s. The elements of NOM will be denoted with i, j, possibly indexed, and those of
CO-NOMwithm,n, possibly indexed. Let us introduce the expanded language formally:
4 In other words, each of them is either a complete operator or a complete dual operator w.r.t. some order type: the operations ✁ and ✄ are respectively
completely join-preserving and completely meet-preserving if they are taken as maps from the order dual C∂ to C.
5 Of course, in principle the binary connectives ∧ and ∨ should each have two residuals, one for each coordinate; however, because ∧ and ∨ are
commutative, the two residuals of each connective end up coinciding.
6 This terminology is coherent with the terminology used in [6] and is inspired from analogous terminology used in hybrid logic.
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Definition 2.14. The formulas ofL+term are given by the following recursive definition:
ϕ ::= ⊥ | ⊤ | p | j | m | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ − ψ | ϕ → ψ | ✸ϕ | ✷ϕ | ✁ϕ | ✄ϕ | _ϕ | ϕ | Jϕ | Iϕ,
where p ∈ PROP, j ∈ NOM andm ∈ CO-NOM.
Like we did for Lterm, we can form inequalities and quasi-inequalities based on L+term. The symbols L+ and L+quasi
respectively denote the set of inequalities between terms in L+term, and the set of quasi-inequalities formed out of L+.
Members of L+, L+quasi, and Lterm not containing any propositional variables (but possibly containing nominals and co-
nominals) will be called pure.
Summing up, we will be working with six sets of syntactic objects, as reported in the following table:
Base language Expanded Language
Formulas / terms Lterm L+term
Inequalities L L+
Quasi-inequalities Lquasi L+quasi
2.5.1. Frame semantics for the expanded language
Adjoint pairs ofmodal operators are best known tomodal logicians from tense logic: indeed thewell-known tense axioms
ϕ → ✷F✸Pϕ ✸P✷Fϕ → ϕ ϕ → ✷P✸Fϕ ✸F✷Pϕ → ϕ
imply that in every tense BAO (A,✸F ,✷F ,✸P ,✷P), the forward-looking diamond ✸F is the left adjoint of the backward-
looking box ✷P and the forward-looking box ✷F is the right adjoint of the backward-looking diamond✸P . On the frame side,
the adjointness relationship betweenmodal operators is captured by the fact that their respective accessibility relations are
converses of one another:
R✷P = (R✸F )−1 R✷F = (R✸P )−1.
This is exactly what happens in the setting of perfect DMA’s and their associated prime structures: indeed, every • ∈
{_,,J,I} dually corresponds to a binary relation R• on J∞(C), each of which is defined analogously to the way in which
the relations corresponding to the ‘white’ operationswere introduced in Definition 2.12: for instance, jRi iff κ(i) ≤ κ(j),
and so on.
Proposition 2.15. For every perfect DMA C,
R_ = (R✷)−1 R = (R✸)−1 RJ = (R✁)−1 RI = (R✄)−1.
Proof. 1. Using (1), we get
jR✷i ⇔ ✷κ(i) ≤ κ(j) ⇔ j ≰ ✷κ(i) ⇔ _j ≰ κ(i) ⇔ i ≤ _j ⇔ iR_j.
The remaining identities can be proved in a similar way. 
A valuation for L+term on a DML frame F is any map V from the set PROP ∪ NOM ∪ CNOM of propositional variables,
nominals, and co-nominals into the set P ↑(W ) of the up-sets of (W ,≤), such that V (p) ∈ P ↑(W ) for each p ∈ PROP,
V (i) = x↑ for some x ∈ W for each i ∈ NOM, and, for eachm ∈ CNOM, it is the case that V (m) = (x↓)c = κ(x↑) for some
x ∈ W . Amodel forL+ is a tupleM = (F , V ) such that F is a DML frame and V is a valuation forL+. For any such model,
the satisfaction relation for formulas inL+ is recursively defined as follows (here we report only the new connectives):
M, w  i iff V (i) = w↑
M, w  m iff V (m) = (w↓)c
M, w  _ϕ iff ∃v(vR✷w & M, v  ϕ)
M, w  ϕ iff ∀v(vR✸w ⇒M, v  ϕ)
M, w  Jϕ iff ∃v(vR✁w & M, v ̸ ϕ)
M, w  Iϕ iff ∀v(vR✄w ⇒M, v ̸ ϕ),
M, w  ϕ → ψ iff ∀v[(w ≤ v &M, v  ϕ)⇒M, v  ψ],
M, w  ϕ − ψ iff ∃v[v ≤ w &M, v  ϕ &M, v ̸ ψ].
The local satisfaction relation extends toL+ andL+quasi as follows:
M, w  ϕ ≤ ψ iff if M, w  ϕ then M, w  ψ ,
M, w  (&ni=1ϕi ≤ ψi)⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ iff if M, w  ϕi ≤ ψi for i = 1, . . . , n then M, w  ϕ ≤ ψ .
From the clauses above, the global satisfaction relation for L+ and L+quasi is defined in the usual way, by universally
quantifying overw.
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For every modelM and every ϕ ∈ L+term, [[ϕ]] denotes as usual the set of states at which ϕ is satisfied. It is easy to see
that
[[ϕ → ψ]] = (([[ϕ]] ∩ [[ψ]]c)↓)c [[ϕ − ψ]] = ([[ϕ]] ∩ [[ψ]]c)↑,
andmoreover, for each⊙ ∈ {✸,✷,✁,✄,_,,J,I}, denoting by (R⊙) the corresponding operation on subsets ofW defined
as in Definition 2.4, we get (R⊙)[[ϕ]] = [[⊙ϕ]]. Hence, a valuation V for L+term can be identified with a homomorphism
(or just an assignment) V+ from the term algebra L+term into the complex algebra F + expanded with the adjoints, such
that V+[NOM] ⊆ J∞(F +) and V+[CNOM] ⊆ M∞(F +). Conversely, an assignment v on a perfect DMA C can be
identified with a valuation v+ on the prime structure C+ such that v+(x) is the ≤C+-up-set {j ∈ J∞ | j ≤ v(x)}, for all
x ∈ PROP ∪ NOM ∪ CNOM.
There are two equivalent ways in which the local satisfaction of formulas can be encoded as a special case of the global
satisfaction of inequalities, as reported in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.16. For every perfect DMA C, every DML frame F , every L+term-valuation V on F and L+term-assignment v on C,
and every ϕ ∈ L+term,
1. the following are equivalent:
(a) F , V , w  ϕ;
(b) F +, V ′+ |= j ≤ ϕ, where j is a new nominal not occurring in ϕ and V ′ is the j-variant of V such that V ′(j) = {w}↑;
(c) F +, V ′+ |̸= ϕ ≤ m, where m is a new co-nominal not occurring in ϕ and V ′ is the m-variant of V such that
V ′(m) = ({w}↓)c .
2. C, v |= j ≤ ϕ iff C+, v+, v(j) |= ϕ.
3. C, v |= ϕ ≤ m iff C+, v+, λ(v(m)) |̸= ϕ.
Admissible valuations for the expanded language. Let G be a descriptive general frame. An admissible valuation for L+term on
G is a valuation for L+term on the underlying DML frame G♯ (see Definition 2.8), such that V (p) ∈ A for each p ∈ PROP. In
other words, thinking of V as a triple of maps into the complex algebra G+♯ , V sends propositional variables to elements of
the subalgebraA, while nominals and co-nominals get sent to join-prime and meet-prime elements of G+♯ , respectively.
For any formula ϕ ∈ L+term and valuation V , we write ϕ(V ) to denote the extension of ϕ inG under the valuation V . Note
that if ϕ is in the basic signature and V is admissible, it follows from the closure conditions (DG3) on A that ϕ(V ) ∈ A.
This, however, is not the case for formulas from the expanded signature or for non-admissible valuations. Suppose p is a
propositional variable occurring in ϕ and V a valuation. For X ∈ P ↑(W ), let V [p := X] be the valuation which is identical
to V except that it sends p to X . Then ϕ(V [p := X]) can be seen as defining an operation from P ↑(W ) into P ↑(W ), which
we will denote as ϕVp (X).
2.5.2. Standard translation
Let L1 be the first-order language with equality with binary relation symbols ≤, R✸, R✷, R✁, R✄, and unary predicate
symbols P,Q , . . . corresponding to the propositional variables p, q, . . . ∈ PROP. As usual, we let L1 contain a denumerable
infinity of individual variables. We will further assume that L1 contains denumerably infinite individual variables i, j, . . .
corresponding to the nominals i, j, . . . ∈ NOM and n,m, . . . corresponding to the co-nominals n,m ∈ CO-NOM. Let L0 be
the sublanguagewhich does not contain the unary predicate symbols P,Q , . . . corresponding to the propositional variables.
Let us now define the standard translation ofL+term into L1 recursively:
STx(⊥) := x ≠ x STx(⊤) := x = x
STx(p) := P(x)
STx(j) := j ≤ x STx(m) := x  m
STx(ϕ ∨ ψ) := STx(ϕ) ∨ STx(ψ) STx(ϕ ∧ ψ) := STx(ϕ) ∧ STx(ψ)
STx(ϕ − ψ) := ∃y(STy(ϕ) ∧ ¬STy(ψ) ∧ y ≤ x) STx(ϕ → ψ) := ∀y((STy(ϕ) ∧ ¬STy(ψ))→ x  y)
STx(✸ϕ) := ∃y(R✸xy ∧ STy(ϕ)) STx(✷ϕ) := ∀y(R✷xy → STy(ϕ))
STx(✁ϕ) := ∃y(R✁xy ∧ ¬STy(ϕ)) STx(✄ϕ) := ∀y(R✄xy → ¬STy(ϕ))
STx(_ϕ) := ∃y(R✷yx ∧ STy(ϕ)) STx(ϕ) := ∀y(R✸yx → STy(ϕ))
STx(Jϕ) := ∃y(R✁yx ∧ ¬STy(ϕ)) STx(Iϕ) := ∀y(R✄yx → ¬STy(ϕ)).
STx extends to L+ and L+quasi as follows: for inequalities, STx(ϕ ≤ ψ) := STx(ϕ) → STx(ψ), and for quasi-inequalities,
STx(ϕ1 ≤ ψ1 & · · ·&ϕn ≤ ψn ⇒ ϕ ≤ ψ) := [STx(ϕ1 ≤ ψ1) ∧ · · · ∧ STx(ϕn ≤ ψn)] → STx(ϕ ≤ ψ). We also extend STx to
finite sets of inequalities by setting STx({ϕ1 ≤ ψ1, . . . , ϕn ≤ ψn}) equal to1≤i≤n STx(ϕi ≤ ψi).
Observe that if STx is applied to pure terms, inequalities, or quasi-inequalities (recall Definition 2.14), it produces formulas
in the sublanguage L0. This will be most important for our purposes. The following lemma is proved by a routine induction.
Lemma 2.17. For any statew in a DML frame F and for every formula, inequality or quasi-inequality ξ ∈ L+term ∪L+ ∪L+quasi,
1. F , w  ξ iff F |= ∀P∀j∀mSTx(ξ)[x := w], and
2. F  ξ iff F |= ∀x∀P∀j∀mSTx(ξ),
where P, j, and m are, respectively, the vectors of all predicate symbols corresponding to propositional variables, individual
variables corresponding to nominals, and individual variables corresponding to co-nominals, occurring in STx(ξ).
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Table 1
Universal and choice nodes.
Choice Universal
+ ∨
+ ✸
+ ✁
− ∧
− ✷
− ✄
+ ✷
+ ✄
− ✸
− ✁
3. Inductive inequalities
In this section, we will introduce the distributive modal logic analogue of the inductive formulas of Goranko and
Vakarelov [16–18]. This class, consisting of inequalities which we will call the inductive inequalities, extends the class of
Sahlqvist inequalities of [14] in the same way as the inductive formulas extend the Sahlqvist formulas. This extension is
proper, in the sense that there are properties of states in frames definable by inductive inequalities and not definable by
any Sahlqvist inequality (more of this in Subsubsection 3.3.4). We will not give a direct proof that all inductive inequalities
are elementary and canonical, but this will follow later as corollaries from the facts that they are all reducible by the ALBA
algorithm and that all inequalities so reducible are elementary and canonical.
3.1. Inductive inequalities: definition and examples
We begin by introducing the following auxiliary definitions and notation: exactly like in [14], the two signed generation
trees associated with any s ∈ Lterm are denoted as+s and−s respectively and are obtained by assigning signs (+ and−) to
the nodes of the generation tree of s, as follows:
• the root node of+s (resp.−s) is the root node of the generation tree of s, signed with+ (resp.−);
• if a node is ∨,∧,✸,✷, then assign the same sign to its immediate successors;
• if a node is ✁,✄, then assign the opposite sign to its immediate successor.
Itwill sometimes be convenient to think of the label of a node in a signed generation tree as including the sign, and sometimes
as not including the sign. This slight ambiguity will cause no problems in practice. We will use ≺ to indicate the ‘signed
subtree’ relation.
In a signed generation tree of a term, we will regard certain types of node as universal nodes and others as choice nodes.
This classification is exactly the same as in [14], and is given in Table 1. Note that choice and universal are disjoint, but not
exhaustive categories, since+∧ and−∨ are neither choice nor universal.
An order type over n ∈ N is an n-tuple ϵ ∈ {1, ∂}n. For every order type ϵ, let ϵ∂ be its opposite order type, i.e., for every
i = 1, . . . , n, ϵ∂i = 1 iff ϵi = ∂ .
For any term s(p1, . . . , pn), any order type ϵ over n, and any i = 1, . . . , n, an ϵ-critical node in the signed generation tree
of s is a (leaf) node+pi with ϵi = 1, or−pi with ϵi = ∂ . An ϵ-critical branch in the tree is a branch terminating in an ϵ-critical
node. The intuition, which will be built upon later, is that variable occurrences corresponding to ϵ-critical nodes are to be
solved for, according to ϵ.
For every term s(p1, . . . , pn), and every order type ϵ, we say that +s (resp. −s) agrees with ϵ, and write ϵ(+s) (resp.
ϵ(−s)), if every leaf in the signed generation tree of +s (resp. −s) is ϵ-critical. In other words, ϵ(+s) (resp. ϵ(−s)) means
that all variable occurrences corresponding to leaves of+s (resp.−s) are to be solved for according to ϵ.
Definition 3.1. Given an order type ϵ, and an irreflexive and transitive relationΩ on the variables p1, . . . , pn, the (negative
or positive) generation tree ∗s, ∗ ∈ {−,+}, of a term s(p1, . . . , pn) is (Ω, ϵ)-inductive if, on every ϵ-critical branch with leaf
labelled pi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, every choice node c with a universal node as ancestor is binary, and hence labelled with ⋆(α ◦ β),
where ⋆ ∈ {+,−}, and moreover:
1. ϵ∂(⋆α), and
2. pj <Ω pi for every pj occurring in α.
Clearly, the conditions above imply that the ϵ-critical branch runs through β . We will refer toΩ as the dependency order on
the variables. An inequality s ≤ t is (Ω, ϵ)-inductive if the trees+s and−t are both (Ω, ϵ)-inductive. An inequality s ≤ t is
inductive if it is (Ω, ϵ)-inductive for someΩ and ϵ.
Remark 3.2. A few remarks about Definition 3.1 are in order:
1. The node c can be either+∨ or−∧, and hence, the corresponding subtree of ∗s rooted at c is either+(α∨β) or−(α∧β).
2. An earlier version of the definition was modelled more closely on the Gehrke et al. definition of Sahlqvist inequalities
in [14], and made use of the notion of left and right inductive terms. Since we will occasionally find it useful to think
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in terms of these notions, we include the formulation here: Given Ω and ϵ, a term s(p1, . . . , pn) is (Ω, ϵ)-left inductive
(resp. (Ω, ϵ)-right inductive) if in the positive (resp., negative) generation tree of s, on every ϵ-critical branch with leaf
labelled pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, every choice node with a universal node as ancestor satisfies either
(a) it is labelledwith+∨, and the corresponding subtree of+s (resp.−s) rooted at this node is+(α∨β), with pi occurring
in β , ϵ∂(+α), and pj <Ω pi for every pj occurring in α, or
(b) it is labelledwith−∧, and the corresponding subtree of+s (resp.−s) rooted at this node is−(α∧β), with pi occurring
in β , ϵ∂(−α), and pj <Ω pi for every pj occurring in α.
It should be clear that an inequality s ≤ t is then (Ω, ϵ)-inductive precisely when s is (Ω, ϵ)-left inductive and t is
(Ω, ϵ)-right inductive.
3. In its current form, Definition 3.1 is a reformulation of the earlier definition, inspired by van Gool’s version of that
definition given in [29].
4. Note that no unary choice node on a critical path in an (Ω, ϵ)-inductive term can have a universal ancestor.
Example 3.3. The inequality ✷(✸q ∨ p) ∧ ✁✷p ≤ ✷✸q is (Ω, ϵ)-inductive for q <Ω p, ϵp = 1 and ϵq = ∂ . It is also
(Ω ′, ϵ′)-inductive for q <Ω p, ϵp = ∂ and ϵq = ∂ .
The inequality ✷(✁q ∨ p) ∧ ✷q ≤ ✸(p ∧ q) is (Ω, ϵ)-inductive with q <Ω p, ϵp = 1 and ϵq = 1. Note that it is not
(Ω, ϵ)-inductive for any ϵ andΩ such that p <Ω q.
Next, the inequality ✷✁(q ∧ r) ∧ ✷(p ∨ ✷q) ≤ ✁✷(p ∧ r) ∨ ✸p is (Ω, ϵ)-inductive with p <Ω q <Ω r , and ϵp = ∂ ,
ϵq = ϵr = 1.
Example 3.4. The inequality ✷(✁✄(q∨ p)∧✄(p∧ q)) ≤ ✸✷p is not inductive. Indeed, in the positive generation tree of the
left-hand side there is a leaf+p from which, going up to the root, one meets a−✄-node (unary choice) before one meets a
+✷-node (universal). Also, in the negative generation tree of the right-hand side, there is a−✷-node (unary choice) before
a−✸-node (universal) on the path up from the leaf−p. It follows that, no matter whether an order type ϵ assigns 1 or ∂ to
p, either condition 1 or condition 2 of Definition 3.1 will be violated.
3.2. The special subclass of Sahlqvist inequalities
Definition 3.5 (cf. [14]). Given an order type ϵ ∈ ({1, ∂})n, the signed generation tree ∗s, ∗ ∈ {−,+}, of a term s(p1, . . . , pn)
is ϵ-Sahlqvist if on no ϵ-critical branch is there a choice node with a universal node as ancestor. An inequality s ≤ t is ϵ-
Sahlqvist if both the trees+s and−t are ϵ-Sahlqvist. An inequality s ≤ t is Sahlqvist if it is ϵ-Sahlqvist for some order type
ϵ.
In keeping with the terminology of [14], a term S will be called ϵ-left Sahlqvist if +s is ϵ-Sahlqvist, and ϵ-right Sahlqvist
if−s is ϵ-Sahlqvist.
Clearly, these Sahlqvist inequalities are special inductive inequalities, since Sahlqvist inequalities exclude every occurrence
of choice nodes in the scope of universal nodes along critical paths in the signed generation trees, whereas inductive
formulas allow such occurrences under certain conditions. Specifically, if s ≤ t is an ϵ-Sahlqvist inequality, then it is an
(Ω, ϵ)-inductive inequality for every irreflexive transitive relation Ω on its variables (and hence in particular, also for the
empty one). The exact relationship between the Sahlqvist and inductive inequalities will be further explored in the ensuing
subsections.
In [14], Sahlqvist inequalities are shown to be elementary and canonical. Their being elementary is shownby reducing the
Sahlqvist inequalities to classical Sahlqvist–van Benthem formulas via Gödel translation. It is also argued that the Sahlqvist
inequalities project onto the Sahlqvist–van Benthem formulas, in the classical case.
Example 3.6. The inequality s(p, q) ≤ t(p, q) := ✸(p ∧ ✷q ∧ ✄q) ≤ ✷(✁p ∨ ✷q) is Sahlqvist. Indeed, notice that in both
the generation trees+s and−t , no choice node occurs in the scope of a universal node, so this inequality is ϵ-Sahlqvist for
every order type ϵ ∈ {1, ∂}2.
The inequality ✷(✸p ∧ ✄✸p ∧ ✁(⊤ ∨ q)) ≤ ✸(p ∨ ✁q) is (∂, 1)-Sahlqvist, and not ϵ-Sahlqvist for any other order type
ϵ ∈ {1, ∂}2.
Lastly, the inequality ✷(✁q∨ p)∧✷q ≤ ✸(p∧ q) from Example 3.3 is not Sahlqvist, since in the positive generation tree
of the left-hand side there is an occurrence of+p in the scope of a choice node which is in the scope of a universal node, and
similarly for−p on the right-hand side. Hence, this inequality cannot be ϵ-Sahlqvist for any order type ϵ.
3.3. Comparison with the classical inductive formulas
In this subsection we are going to compare the inductive and Sahlqvist inequalities with the inductive and Sahlqvist–
van Benthem formulas, respectively. To facilitate this comparison we need two things: firstly, a more suitable equivalent
reformulation of the definition of the inductive formulas. This is given in Subsection 3.3.1, where the normalized inductive
formulas are introduced. Secondly, we have to peg out the common ground upon which the comparison is to take place
(Subsection 3.3.2). This will be the class of classical DML frames, i.e., those DML frames which are essentially Kripke frames,
and hence, upon which both the basic modal language (hereafter denoted as ML) andL are interpretable and expressively
equivalent.
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3.3.1. Inductive formulas and normalized inductive formulas
We begin by recalling the definition of the inductive formulas. Note however, that what we will here call inductive
formulas are actually themonadic inductive formulas, namely the projection of the full class of inductive formulas, defined
for polyadic multi-modal languages, onto ML.
Definition 3.7 ([18]). Let ♯ be a symbol not belonging to ML. Then a box-form of ♯ in ML is defined recursively as follows:
1. ♯ is a box-form of ♯.
2. If B(♯) is a box-form of ♯, then ✷B(♯) is a box-form of ♯.
3. If B(♯) is a box-form of ♯, and A is a positive formula, then A → B(♯) is a box-form of ♯.
Thus, box-forms of ♯ are, up to semantic equivalence, of the type
A0 → ✷(A1 → · · ·✷(An → #) · · · ).
By substituting a propositional variable p for ♯ in a box-form B(♯), we obtain a box-formula of p, namely B(p). The last
occurrence of the variable p is the head of B(p), and every other occurrence of a variable in B(p) is called inessential there.
A regular formula is any ML-formula built up from ⊤, ⊥, positive formulas and negated box-formulas, by applying
conjunctions, disjunctions and boxes.
The dependency digraph of a set of box-formulas B = {B1(p1), . . . , Bn(pn)} is a digraph GB = ⟨V , E⟩, where V =
{p1, . . . , pn} is the set of heads in B, and edge set E, such that piEpj iff pi occurs as an inessential variable in some box-
formula B(pj) ∈ B. A digraph is acyclic if it does not contain oriented cycles (including loops). The dependency digraph of a
formula is the dependency digraph of the set of box-formulas that occur as subformulas of that formula.
An inductive formula is a regular formula with an acyclic dependency digraph.
Example 3.8. The formula ¬p ∨ ¬✷(✸p → ✷q) ∨ ✸✷✷q is an inductive formula. Indeed, ¬p and ¬✷(✸p → ✷q) are the
negated box-formulas occurring as subformulas, and the dependency digraph has one arc, namely from p to q. It was shown
in [18] that this formula is not equivalent on frames to any Sahlqvist formula.
Definition 3.7 is constructive, in the sense that it describes recursively how inductive formulas are built. For the sake
of comparison with the Sahlqvist–van Benthem formulas, we need a ‘‘forbidden combination’’-style definition also for the
inductive inequalities. Some elements of the following definition may seem somewhat counter-intuitive. For example, the
requirements are formulated in terms of negative occurrences of pi for ϵi = 1, which seems the opposite of what is required
by Definition 3.1. This is explained by the fact that the formulas here will correspond to right inductive terms, and that we
choose to work with the formula as it stands, rather than with its negative generation tree.
Definition 3.9 (Normalized Inductive Formulas). Let (p1, . . . , pn) be a vector of propositional variables, ϵ = (ϵ1, . . . , ϵn) be
an order type, andΩ be an irreflexive transitive relation on {p1, . . . , pn}. An ML-formula ϕ, with PROP(ϕ) ⊆ {p1, . . . , pn},
is an (Ω, ϵ)-inductive formula if
1. it is in negation normal form,
2. no negative (positive) occurrence of a variable pi with ϵi = 1 (ϵi = ∂) is in the scope of a ✷ which is in the scope of a ✸,
and
3. if a negative (positive) occurrence of a variable pi with ϵi = 1 (ϵi = ∂) is in the scope of a ∧which is a scope of a ✸, then
the subformula with this ∧ as main connective is in the form α ∧ β with
(a) the p-occurrence in β ,
(b) ϵ(+α), and
(c) for every variable pj ∈ PROP(α), pj <Ω pi.
AnML-formula ϕ is a normalized inductive formula if it is an (Ω, ϵ)-inductive formula for some order type ϵ and irreflexive
transitive relationΩ .
Lemma 3.10. Every inductive formula is locally equivalent on frames to a normalized inductive formula and vice versa.
Proof. Let ϕ be an inductive formula, and ϕ′ be its negation normal form. Let (p1, . . . , pn) be the vector of all variables
occurring inϕ, letΩ be the irreflexive transitive relation on {p1, . . . , pn} obtained as the transitive closure of the dependency
digraph of ϕ, and let ϵ = (1, 1, . . . , 1). We will now proceed to show that ϕ′ is an (Ω, ϵ)-inductive formula.
To begin with, the negation normal forms of negated box-formulas are, up to equivalence, of the form ✸(A1 ∧ ✸(A2 ∧
· · ·✸¬p) · · · ), where the Ai are positive formulas. Let us call such a formula a diamond formula with head p. Then, ϕ′ is built
up from positive formulas and diamond formulas, using ∧, ∨ and ✷.
Since ϵ = (1, . . . , 1), in checking that ϕ′ is (Ω, ϵ)-normalized inductive, the only variable occurrences that we need
to worry about are the negative ones, and all of these are the heads of diamond formulas. Thus, consider any diamond
subformula A = ✸(A1 ∧ ✸(A2 ∧ · · ·✸¬p) · · · ) of ϕ′ with head p. The only diamonds in ϕ′ in the scope of which this p-
occurrence occurs are those within A. From this it is clear that:
1. p is not in the scope of any ✷which is in the scope of some ✸, i.e. condition 2 of Definition 3.9 is satisfied, and
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2. all the occurrences of other variableswithin A are positive and strictly less than p in theΩ-ordering (asΩ is the transitive
closure of the dependency digraph, which is acyclic by assumption), so condition 3 of Definition 3.9 is also satisfied.
Thus, we have proved that every inductive formula is (semantically, in fact) equivalent to a normalized inductive formula.
Now suppose that ϕ is an (Ω, ϵ)-inductive formula, with PROP(ϕ) = {p1, . . . , pn}. Let ϕ1 be obtained from ϕ by
uniformly substituting ¬pi for each variable pi with ϵi = ∂ , and eliminating any resulting double negations. Then ϕ1 is
an (Ω, ϵ′)-inductive formula, where ϵ′ = (1, 1, . . . , 1). Next, let ϕ2 be obtained from ϕ1 by distributing ✸ and ∧ over ∨ as
much as possible. Note that ϕ2 is still an (Ω, ϵ′)-inductive formula.
As for showing that ϕ2 is equivalent to a regular formula, we now claim that ϕ2 is built up from positive formulas and
diamond formulas ✸(A1 ∧ ✸(A2 ∧ · · ·✸¬p) · · · ) (as defined above in this proof), using ∧, ∨ and ✷. Indeed, consider any
negative variable occurrence ¬pi, and let A = ✸A′ be the maximal subformula with ✸ as main connective containing this
occurrence of¬pi. In following the path from¬p up to the root of the generation tree of ✸A′, it is impossible to encounter a
✷, as this would entail a violation of condition 2 of Definition 3.9. Combining this with the fact that ✸’s and ∧’s have been
exhaustively distributed over ∨’s, it follows that there can be no ∨ on the path from ¬pi up to the root. Thus, the only
connectives encountered on this path are∧ and✸; hence, by condition 3 of Definition 3.9, all other variable occurrences are
positive and<Ω pi. The claim follows.
The proof is complete oncewe note that every diamond formula✸(A1∧✸(A2∧· · ·✸¬p) · · · ) is equivalent to the negated
box-formula ¬✷(A1 → ✷(A2 → · · ·✷p) · · · ). 
Example 3.11. Transforming the inductive formula from Example 3.8 into negation normal form yields¬p∨✸(✸p∧✸¬q)∨
✸✷✷q. This is an (Ω, ϵ)-normalized inductive formula forΩ = {(p, q)} and ϵ = (1, 1).
3.3.2. Classical DML frames
A DML frame F = (W ,≤, R✷, R✸, R✄, R✁) is classical if ≤ = R✄ = R✁ = {(w,w) | w ∈ W } and R✷ = R✸. Note that
every subset of a classical DML frame is an up-set, and hence, for these frames every valuation is persistent. A classical model
is pair (F , V ) consisting of a classical DML frame F and a valuation V .
Two remarks about classical DML frames and models: firstly, on classical models, the semantics of ✁ and ✄ becomes
the same as that of ¬; secondly, we may naturally view any classical DML frame (W ,≤, R✷, R✸, R✄, R✁) as a Kripke frame
(W , R)whereR = R✷ = R✸, andhence, in thisway interpretMLon classical DML frames andmodels. These twoobservations
inspire the following definitions.
We define a translation Class(·) from Lterm into ML as follows: Class(ϕ) is obtained from ϕ by simply replacing each
occurrence of ✁ and ✄ in ϕ with ¬, for any ϕ ∈ Lterm. We extend Class to L by specifying that Class(ϕ ≤ ψ) =
¬Class(ϕ) ∨ Class(ψ).
The translation Dist(·) is essentially the inverse of Class(·): for any ϕ ∈ ML in negation normal form, Dist(ϕ) is obtained
from ϕ by replacing each occurrence of¬ in ϕ with ✁. An equivalent option would have been to replace¬with ✄.
Proposition 3.12. Let (F , V ) be a classical DML model. Then, for everyw ∈ F and all ϕ,ψ ∈ Lterm and γ ∈ ML, it holds that
1. (F , V ), w  ϕ iff (F , V ), w  Class(ϕ),
2. (F , V ), w  ϕ ≤ ψ iff (F , V ), w  Class(ϕ ≤ ψ), and
3. (F , V ), w  γ iff (F , V ), w  Dist(γ ).
Proof. (2) is a direct consequence of (1), while (1) can be proven by straightforward structural induction on ϕ. We only
check the case when ϕ is ✁ϕ′. Indeed (F , V ), w  ✁ϕ′ iff there exists some v ∈ W such that wR✁v and (F , V ), v ̸ ϕ′,
iff (F , V ), w ̸ ϕ′ (since R✁ is the diagonal), iff (F , V ), w ̸ Class(ϕ′) (by the inductive hypothesis), iff (F , V ), w 
¬Class(ϕ′), iff (F , V ), w  Class(✁ϕ′).
(3) follows by a similar induction. 
3.3.3. Inductive inequalities compared to normalized inductive formulas
In the light of Proposition 3.12, the following lemma says that, over the classical frames, the Sahlqvist and inductive
inequalities project onto the Sahlqvist–van Benthem and normalized inductive formulas, respectively.
Proposition 3.13. 1. If ϕ ≤ ψ is a Sahlqvist inequality, then the negation normal form of Class(ϕ ≤ ψ) is a Sahlqvist–van
Benthem formula.
2. If ϕ is a Sahlqvist–van Benthem formula, then⊤ ≤ Dist(ϕ) is a Sahlqvist inequality.
3. If ϕ ≤ ψ is an inductive inequality, then the negation normal form of Class(ϕ ≤ ψ) is a normalized inductive formula.
4. If ϕ is a normalized inductive formula, then⊤ ≤ Dist(ϕ) is an inductive inequality.
Proof. We prove items 3 and 4, the proofs of 1 and 2 being analogous and simpler. To prove 3, we proceed contrapositively
and suppose that ϕ ≤ ψ is an inequality, ϵ an order type andΩ an irreflexive transitive relation on the variables of ϕ ≤ ψ
such that the negation normal form ϕ′ ∨ ψ ′ of Class(ϕ ≤ ψ) is not an (Ω, ϵ)-inductive formula. Hence, ϕ′ ∨ ψ ′ violates
condition 2 or 3 of Definition 3.9. Suppose it is condition 2 that is violated. Specifically, suppose that there is some occurrence
of ¬pi with ϵi = 1 in ϕ′ ∨ ψ ′ which is in the scope of a ✷which in turn is in the scope of a ✸. (The case when the offending
occurrence is a pi with ϵi = δ) is symmetric.) There are now two cases to consider:
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Case 1: The offending occurrence is in ϕ′, i.e., in the negation normal form of ¬Class(ϕ). But then there is a path in the
generation tree +ϕ starting at a +pi from which, proceeding up to the root, one encounters a +✸ or −✷ before a
+✷ or−✸. Either way, ϕ is not (Ω, ϵ)-left inductive.
Case 2: The offending occurrence is in ψ ′. The argument is similar to that in case 1.
Next, suppose that it is condition 3 that is violated. Then ϕ′ ∨ψ ′ has a subformula✸γ (α′ ∧β ′) such that¬pi with ϵi = 1
occurs in β ′, but either it is not the case that ϵ(+α′) or there is an occurrence of pj in α′ such that pj ≮Ω pi. (The case when
the offending occurrence is a pi with ϵi = δ is once again symmetric.) If this subformula is in ϕ′, then there is a path in the
generation tree+ϕ starting at a+pi fromwhich, proceeding up to the root, one encounters either (a) a+∨ node with a+✷
or−✸ node as ancestor, and such that the corresponding subtree+(α ∨ β) violates condition 1(a) of Definition 3.1; or (b)
a−∧ node with a+✷ or−✸ node as ancestor, and such that the corresponding subtree−(α ∧ β) violates condition 1(b) of
Definition 3.1.
If the offending subformula is in ψ ′, the argument is similar.
To consider item 4, suppose that ϕ is an (Ω, ϵ)-inductive formula. The fact that ⊤ ≤ Dist(ϕ) is (Ω, ϵ)-inductive (and
hence the claim) follows easily from this assumption, the definition of the translationDist(·), and the following observations.
(i) In Dist(ϕ), the operation✄ does not occur and, since ϕ is in negation normal form,✁ occurs only directly before variables.
Hence, (ii) in the negative generation tree of Dist(ϕ), all occurrences of ✁ are signed negative, and are parents of leaves,
and hence, (iii) the only universal nodes which can have choice nodes as descendants are labelled −✸. Now the definition
of normalized inductive formulas guarantees that the only possible choice node in the scope of this universal is −∧, and
moreover that conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 3.1 are verified. 
Example 3.14. Consider the normalized inductive formula ¬p ∨ ✸(✸p ∧ ✸¬q) ∨ ✸✷✷q from Example 3.11. Applying
the translation Dist to this formula yields ✁p ∨ ✸(✸p ∧ ✸ ✁ q) ∨ ✸✷✷q which, if we turn it into an inequality, becomes
⊤ ≤ ✁p ∨ ✸(✸p ∧ ✸ ✁ q) ∨ ✸✷✷q. This is an (Ω, ϵ)-inductive inequality with p <Ω q and ϵ(p) = ϵ(q) = 1.
As expected, applying Class reverses this process:
Class (⊤ ≤ ✁p ∨ ✸(✸p ∧ ✸ ✁ q) ∨ ✸✷✷q) = ¬⊤ ∨ (¬p ∨ ✸(✸p ∧ ✸¬q) ∨ ✸✷✷q).
3.3.4. The inductive inequalities essentially extend the Sahlqvist inequalities
The following lemma shows that the inductive inequalities represent an essential enlargement of the class of Sahlqvist
inequalities, in the sense that there exist inductive inequalities which are not equivalent on frames to any Sahlqvist
inequality.
Lemma 3.15. The inductive inequality ⊤ ≤ ✁p ∨ ✸(✸p ∧ ✸ ✁ q) ∨ ✸✷✷q (Example 3.14) is not equivalent on frames to any
Sahlqvist inequality.
Proof. Recall from Examples 3.8, 3.11 and 3.14 that on classical models (and hence, classical frames) this inequality is
equivalent to an inductive formula which is not equivalent on frames to any Sahlqvist–van Benthem formula. Now, if it
were equivalent (on frames) to a Sahlqvist inequality ϕ ≤ ψ , it would also be equivalent to it on all classical frames. But, by
Propositions 3.12 and 3.13, this wouldmean that the normalized inductive formula Class(⊤ ≤ ✁p∨✸(✸p∧✸✁q)∨✸✷✷q)
is equivalent on frames to the Sahlqvist–van Benthem formula Class(ϕ ≤ ψ), which is a contradiction. 
3.4. Recognizing inductive inequalities in different signatures
Weconclude this section on inductive inequalities by discussing someunresolved issues, which include the pros and cons
of the choice of the algebraic signature of DML (an issue which we only now have the prerequisites to properly evaluate),
and the identification of the order-theoretic principles underlying the definition of Sahlqvist and inductive inequalities;
moreover, we show how these principles uniformly apply to different signatures; finally, this discussion enables us to draw
some positive conclusions on the adequacy of inductive inequalities for the correspondence theory of intuitionistic logic
and its expansions. Let us start with the pros of developing our theory on DML. Firstly, as already mentioned early on, DML
is a natural choice from a ‘‘historical’’ viewpoint, since the Sahlqvist theory has already been developed for this signature
[14], and therefore it provides a good test case for improvement. But there are also intrinsic reasons justifying this choice:
indeed, the signature of DML:
(1) is exhaustive in the unary modal signature, in the sense that it samples all the different order-theoretic behaviours
of unary operations that guarantee the application of the correspondence mechanism;
(2) is so general as to lack any deduction detachment theorem, and hence inequalities, and not formulas, encode
deduction; but still the mechanism of correspondence generalizes very naturally to inequalities without losing any crucial
feature. So in a sense, the case study of DML makes the point that inequalities and not formulas are at the right level of
generality when correspondence is concerned;
(3) is expressive enough to guarantee that it projects adequately onto the whole basic classical signature;
(4) encompasses well-known nonclassical modal logics, such as positive modal logic.
On the other hand, DML does not encompass intuitionistic modal logic [12,22] (although the two logics are akin, so
adapting the theory requires only minimal additional work, as we will see next).
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Table 2
Universal and choice nodes for the signature of IML.
Choice Universal
+ ∨
+ ✸
+ ✁
+ →
− ∧
− ✷
− ✄
− →
+ ✷
+ ✄
+ →
− ✸
− ✁
A more serious disadvantage of DML is methodological: although possible, it is not straightforward to extract a general
modus operandi from the theory developed so far when it comes to extending the definition of inductive and Sahlqvist
inequalities to general, polyadic signatures. The present subsection is intended to remedy this at least partially, and a more
thorough discussionwill appear in the forthcoming paper [7]. There are two reasons for this difficulty: firstly, the only binary
operations which could help for a comparison are join and meet, which are quite special; secondly, two order-theoretic
properties collapse when applied to unary operations, which are quite distinct in the binary case: one property is being
a right or a left adjoint (like the box or the diamond, respectively); the other property is being a right or a left residual
(like the Heyting implication and the meet, respectively, or the join and the subtraction, respectively). The first definition
of course also applies to the binary (or n-ary) operations (just understanding them as maps having the product algebra as
their domains), and it turns out that the meet and the join respectively are the right and the left adjoint of the diagonal map
∆ : C→ C× C defined by the assignment x → (x, x): indeed, denoting the product order on C× C by≤×, the definition
of supremum and infimum implies that, for all x, y, z ∈ C,
x ≤ y ∧ z iff x ≤ y and x ≤ z iff ∆(x) ≤× (y, z)
y ∨ z ≤ x iff y ≤ x and z ≤ x iff (y, z) ≤× ∆(x).
For n-ary operationswith n > 1, the global form of adjunction is strictly stronger than the coordinatewise adjunction (which
from now on will be referred to as residuation). Summing up:
∧ is both a left residual and a right adjoint (and hence a right residual), but is not a left adjoint;
∨ is both a right residual and a left adjoint (and hence a left residual), but is not a right adjoint;
✷ is a right adjoint (i.e., a right residual), but is not a left adjoint (i.e., not a left residual);
✸ is left adjoint (i.e., a left residual), but is not a right adjoint (i.e., not a right residual).
The order-theoretic analysis of classical correspondence appearing in [8] and the way ALBAworks provide enough evidence
that the notions of ‘‘choice’’ and ‘‘universal’’ nodes reported in Table 1 identify the lack of someorder-theoretic properties. Let
us adopt the convention that a positively signed operation has a property if the unsigned connective, seen as an operation
on C, has that property, and that a negatively signed connective has a property if and only if the unsigned connective,
seen as an operation on C∂ , has that property. Now, reading Table 1 against the facts above should convince the reader
that
Choice = Not a right adjoint
Universal = Not a left residual.
For instance,+∧ is neither choice (indeed,∧ is a right adjoint) nor universal (indeed,∧ is a left residual, although is not
a left adjoint); moreover,−∧ is choice (indeed∧ is not a left adjoint) but it is not universal (indeed,∧ is a right adjoint, and
hence is a right residual).
Having made the order-theoretic content of the choice/universal classification explicit makes it possible to extend
this classification to different signatures, which is the basic preliminary needed to recognize Sahlqvist and inductive
formulas/inequalities in each given signature. Notice also that the order-theoretic content of the classification reveals the
existence of an asymmetry between the two classes, given by the fact that adjunction is stronger than residuation, which
cannot be detected by unary operations, due to the fact that adjunction and residuation collapse in that case; this brings
us to a third reason why the DML signature is too special to be paradigmatic: each operator (modulo taking the order dual
of the domain in the case of the triangles) happens to be either a left residual or a right adjoint. Thus, the choice/universal
classification is mutually exclusive for the connectives in the DML signature, something which, in general, need not be
the case. For instance, since the Heyting implication→ is a right residual but not a left residual and is neither a left nor
a right adjoint, we have that + → is both choice and universal and − → is only choice. The classification for the DML
signature expanded with intuitionistic implication is described in Table 2. Given these preliminaries, Definitions 3.1 and 3.5
can now be applied to this expanded signature, which, for the purpose of this subsection, we will refer to as the signature
of intuitionistic modal logic (IML). Moreover, since IML inequalities s ≤ t can be equivalently rewritten as ⊤ ≤ s → t ,
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Sahlqvist and inductive formulas can be defined for this signature in the obvious way and these definitions can be taken as
basic, just as in the Boolean case.
However, if we apply Definitions 3.1 and 3.5 ceteris paribus, we incur another problem; namely, inequalities such as
p → ✷p ≤ ✸✷p, which cannot be solved, would be Sahlqvist according to Definition 3.5. The easiest way to fix this problem
(without changing Definitions 3.1 and 3.5) is to adopt the convention that the ancestor (or ‘scope of’) a relation in term-
generation trees be reflexive. Thus, the presence of a choice-and-universal node on critical branches would constitute an
occurrence of a choice node in the scope of a universal. Notice that adopting this convention or not is of no consequence for
the DML signature, thanks again to the fact that the choice/universal classification is mutually exclusive for the connectives
in DML. In the next example we look at the Sahlqvist/inductive status of some important axioms for the basic intuitionistic
modal logic IK if we adopt this convention.
Example 3.16. The Fischer–Servi axioms [12]
✸(p → q)→ (✷p → ✸q) (✸p → ✷q)→ ✷(p → q),
are ϵ-Sahlqvist for ϵp = 1 and ϵq = ∂ . The well-known Frege axiom of intuitionistic logic,
(p → (q → r))→ ((p → q)→ (p → r)),
is not Sahlqvist, but properly inductive. Indeed, in the generation trees+(p → (q → r)) and−((p → q)→ (p → r)), there
is both a negative and a positive occurrence of q in the scope of a+ → which is both choice and universal, and hence this
formula/inequality cannot be ϵ-Sahlqvist for any ϵ. However it is easy to see that the formula/inequality is (Ω, ϵ)-inductive,
taking p <Ω q <Ω r and ϵp = ϵq = ϵr = 1.
Lastly consider the IML inequality ✷((✷p → q) ∧ (q → ✷p)) ≤ p. To see that this is not inductive, consider the case
where ϵq = 1; we have an occurrence of +q in the subtree +(✷p → q), and + → is both choice and universal. So it
would have to be the case that ϵp = 1 and p <Ω q. But then we also have an occurrence of+p in the subtree+(q → ✷p),
which in order to be legal would require q <Ω p, which is a contradiction. And likewise, assuming that ϵq = ∂ also leads to
contradiction.
The fact that (p → (q → r)) → ((p → q) → (p → r)) is properly inductive is very interesting, since, as far as the
authors are aware, no properly inductive axioms crop up in the axiomatic definitions of the standard Boolean-based modal
logics. Indeed, it seems that all well-known classical axioms which have first-order correspondents and are not Sahlqvist,
such as the conjunction of the transitivity and McKinsey axioms (which is clearly not inductive), lie beyond the reach of the
correspondence mechanisms underlying the Sahlqvist and inductive classes.
Finally, the convention of taking the ancestor relation as reflexive is a bit contrived, and we do not believe that is the
optimal solution. A more natural solution is in fact given by dropping the choice/universal classification (based, as we
have seen, on the lack of order-theoretic properties, which prevents the correspondence mechanism from going through),
in favour of a classification positively based on the satisfaction of the properties which enable the same correspondence
mechanism to succeed. Such an alternative classification is introduced and discussed in [7].
4. The Ackermann lemmas
The following two lemmas facilitate the elimination of propositional variables from inequalities and will be key to the
correspondence results developed in this paper. They are DML analogues of a lemma proved by Ackermann in [1] in the
context of second-order logic.
First some terminology. Two valuations V and V ′ on a frame F are called p-variants for p ∈ PROP (notation: V ∼p V ′) if
V (a) = V ′(a) for all a ∈ (PROP− {p}) ∪ NOM ∪ CO-NOM.
Definition 4.1. A formula ϕ ∈ L+term is positive (resp., negative) in a propositional variable p if in its positive generation tree
all p-nodes are signed+ (resp.,−). An inequality ϕ ≤ ψ ∈ L+ is positive (resp., negative) in a propositional variable p if ϕ
is negative (resp., positive) in p and ψ is positive (resp., negative) in p.
A standard inductive argument shows that, if ϕ is positive in p, then its induced semantic operation ϕVp (X) (defined on
page 345) is monotone (or order-preserving) and antitone (order-reversing) if ϕ is negative in p. We will often say that ϕ(p)
is monotone (antitone) in p if ϕVp (X) is monotone (antitone).
Lemma 4.2 (Right Ackermann Lemma). Let α1, . . . , αn ∈ L+ with p ∉ PROP(αi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let β1(p), . . . , βm(p) ∈ L+ be
positive in p, and let γ1(p), . . . , γm(p) ∈ L+ be negative in p. Let V be any valuation on a frame F . Then,
F , V  βj(α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αn/p) ≤ γj(α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αn/p), for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m
iff there exists some V ′ ∼p V such that
F , V ′  αi ≤ p for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and F , V ′  βj(p) ≤ γj(p), for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
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Proof. For the implication from top to bottom, letV ′(p) = V (ni=1 αi). Since theαi do not contain p, we haveV (αi) = V ′(αi),
and hence, V ′(αi) ⊆ni=1 V (αi) = V (ni=1 αi) = V ′(p). Moreover, by assumption we get, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
V ′(βj(p)) = V

βj

n
i=1
αi/p

⊆ V

γj

n
i=1
αi/p

= V ′(γj(p)).
For the implication from bottom to top, wemake use of the fact that the βj aremonotone (since they are positive) in p, while
the γj are antitone (since they are negative) in p. SinceV (αi) = V ′(αi) ⊆ V ′(p) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we haveV (ni=1 αi) ⊆ V ′(p),
and hence,
V

βj

n
i=1
αi/p

⊆ V ′(βj(p)) ⊆ V ′(γj(p)) ⊆ V

γj

n
i=1
αi/p

. 
The proof of the following version of the lemma is similar.
Lemma 4.3 (Left Ackermann Lemma). Let α1, . . . , αn ∈ L+ with p ∉ PROP(αi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let β1(p), . . . , βm(p) ∈ L+ be
negative in p, and let γ1(p), . . . , γm(p) ∈ L+ be positive in p. Let V be any valuation on a frame F . Then,
F , V  βj(α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn/p) ≤ γj(α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn/p), for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m
iff there exists a V ′ ∼p V such that
F , V ′  p ≤ αi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and F , V ′  βj(p) ≤ γj(p), for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
5. The algorithm, informally
When applied from bottom to top, Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 provide a way to eliminate occurrences of propositional variables
fromsets of inequalities. It is the presence of these propositional variableswhich gives rise to the second-order quantification
in the corresponding frame conditions. Hence, if one can eliminate the propositional variables from an inequality, hence
transforming it into an equivalent pure (recall Definition 2.14) inequality (or set of pure inequalities), this would yield a
first-order frame correspondent for it. Consider the inductive inequality
✷(✸q ∨ p) ∧ ✁✷p ≤ ✷✸q, (3)
from Example 3.3. We would like to see how we can use Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 to eliminate the propositional variables p
and q from it, and in so doing determine a first-order frame correspondent for it. To this end, let F be any frame and
F + be its complex algebra. As it stands, it is not clear how (3) could be equivalently rewritten into a form which makes
one of the Ackermann lemmas applicable. To overcome this, we make use of one of the two characterizing properties
of perfect algebras (cf. Subsection 2.5), namely, the fact that every element in a perfect algebra is both the join of the
completely join-prime elements below it and the meet of the completely meet-prime elements above it. This property
enables us to express the validity of (3) in F + in terms of two simultaneous ‘‘approximations’’, from below and above.
Indeed, F + |= ✷(✸q ∨ p) ∧ ✁✷p ≤ ✷✸q iff
F + |= ∀i0∀m0[(i0 ≤ ✷(✸q ∨ p) ∧ ✁✷p & ✷✸q ≤ m0)⇒ i0 ≤ m0], (4)
where i0 andm0 are a nominal and co-nominal which, as indicated in Subsection 2.5, range over the completely join-prime
and completely meet-prime elements of F +, respectively. The variable q is minimal with respect to the ordering Ω (see
Example 3.3), so wewill try to eliminate it first. To this end, let us focus on✷✸q ≤ m0. Next, we are going tomake use of the
second characterizing property of perfect algebras, namely, that the operations preserve or reverse arbitrary joins or meets,
and are therefore adjoints. The inequality above is equivalent to ✷
{b ∈ M∞ | ✸q ≤ b} ≤ m0, and since ✷ is a complete
dual operator, this is equivalent to
{✷b | ✸q ≤ b ∈ M∞} ≤ m0. Now, since m0 denotes a completely meet-prime
element, the latter inequality is the case iff there exists a m1 ∈ M∞,7 such that ✸q ≤ m1 and ✷m1 ≤ m0. Next, applying
the adjunction property for ✸, we have ✸q ≤ m1 iff q ≤ m1. Moreover, sincem1 does not occur in the consequent of the
implication, we can equivalently pull ∃m1 into the prefix as ∀m1. Thus, (4) is equivalent to
F + |= ∀i0∀m0∀m1[(i0 ≤ ✷(✸q ∨ p) ∧ ✁✷p & q ≤ m1 & ✷m1 ≤ m0)⇒ i0 ≤ m0]. (5)
Noting that, in the inequalities i0 ≤ ✷(✸q ∨ p) ∧ ✁✷p and ✷m1 ≤ m0, the left-hand sides are antitone and the right-hand
sides are monotone in q, we see that Lemma 4.3 is now applicable to the antecedent in (5), which transforms it onto
F + |= ∀i0∀m0∀m1[(i0 ≤ ✷(✸m1 ∨ p) ∧ ✁✷p & ✷m1 ≤ m0)⇒ i0 ≤ m0]. (6)
7 For the sake of this informal discussion we will be a bit sloppy, and confuse propositional variable and (co-)nominals with the elements of the algebra
interpreting them.
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Thus, it remains to eliminate p. To this end, we focus on the inequality i0 ≤ ✷(✸m1 ∨ p) ∧ ✁✷p. This is equivalent to the
pair of inequalities i0 ≤ ✷(✸m1 ∨ p) and i0 ≤ ✁✷p. The first of these can be rewritten as _i0 ≤ ✸m1 ∨ p through the
application of adjunction for ✷. Next, applying adjunction for ∨we get_i0 − ✸m1 ≤ p. Thus, (6) is transformed into
F + |= ∀i0∀m0∀m1[(_i0 − ✸m1 ≤ p & i0 ≤ ✁✷p & ✷m1 ≤ m0)⇒ i0 ≤ m0]. (7)
Since, in the inequalities i0 ≤ ✁✷p and ✷m1 ≤ m0, the left-hand sides are monotone and the right-hand sides are antitone
in p, Lemma 4.2 can be applied to transform (7) into
F + |= ∀i0∀m0∀m1[(i0 ≤ ✁✷(_i0 − ✸m1) & ✷m1 ≤ m0)⇒ i0 ≤ m0]. (8)
Thus, we have eliminated all propositional variables from (4), but the result does still contain nominals and co-nominals.
Note that, when interpreted in F +, nominals and co-nominals range over sets of the form x↑ and (x↓)c for x ∈ W , which
are first-order definable. It follows that (8) translates into a first-order condition on the frame F : indeed, it is equivalent to
F |= ∀x0∀y0∀y1
 x0↑ ⊆ ⟨R✁][R✷](⟨R−1✷ ⟩x0↑ ∩ (⟨R✸⟩[R−1✸ ](y1↓)c)c)↑&
[R✷](y1↓)c ⊆ (y0↓)c
⇒ x0↑ ⊆ (y0↓)c
 (9)
which can be easily, if rather tediously, translated into the first-order frame correspondence language L0.
6. The algorithm ALBA, formally
We will now formalize the procedure illustrated in the previous section into an algorithm which we will call ‘ALBA’.
The name is an acronym for ‘‘Ackermann-lemma-based algorithm’’. We do not pretend that the following is a complete
specification of an implementable algorithm. Many issues, like the choice of rules to apply, the order in which variables are
eliminated, and backtracking will not be addressed. Our aim is rather to provide a set of rules together with an outline of
how these can be applied in order to derive frame correspondents of DML inequalities. As will be shown in Section 9, any
inequality for which such a correspondent can be successfully derived using ALBA is also guaranteed to be canonical.
ALBA proceeds in three stages. The first one takes a DML inequality, or a set of DML inequalities, and preprocesses these.
To each inequality ϕj ≤ ψj resulting from this preprocessing, the first approximation rule is applied, producing the pair of
inequalities i0 ≤ ϕ andψ ≤ m0. Here the processing branches,with the second stage (called the reduction stage) proceeding
separately on each of these pairs. The aim of the reduction stage is to eliminate all occurring propositional variables from
the set of inequalities, by applying the residuation, approximation and Ackermann rules. If this succeeds on every branch,
we proceed to the third stage; if not, ALBA reports failure and terminates. The third stage is the output stage, which returns
a frame correspondent for the input inequality (or set of inequalities). This frame correspondent can be either a pureL+quasi-
formula or the (first-order) frame translation thereof, depending upon the user’s preference.Wewill now proceed to specify
these stages and the rules used by each.
6.1. Phase 1: input, preprocessing and first approximation
ALBA receives anL-inequality ϕ ≤ ψ as input, and preprocesses it by performing the following steps exhaustively:
1. in the positive generation tree of ϕ (resp. negative generation tree of ψ),
(a) push down, towards variables, occurrences of +✸, +∧ and −✄, by distributing them only over occurrences of +∨
which are not below universal nodes, and
(b) push down, towards variables, occurrences of −✷, −∨ and +✁, by distributing them only over occurrences of −∧
which are not below universal nodes;
2. apply the splitting rules:
α ≤ β ∧ γ
α ≤ β α ≤ γ
α ∨ β ≤ γ
α ≤ γ β ≤ γ
3. apply themonotone and antitone variable elimination rules:
α(p) ≤ β(p)
α(⊥) ≤ β(⊥)
γ (p) ≤ δ(p)
γ (⊤) ≤ δ(⊤)
for α(p) ≤ β(p) positive (recall Definition 4.1) and γ (p) ≤ δ(p) negative in p, respectively.
Denote by Preprocess(ϕ ≤ ψ) the finite set {ϕi ≤ ψi}i∈I of inequalities obtained in this way. Thus, Preprocess(ϕ ≤
ψ) contains only inequalities to which none of the preprocessing steps is applicable any more. To each ϕi ≤ ψi ∈
Preprocess(ϕ ≤ ψ), the following first approximation rule is applied only once:
ϕi ≤ ψi
i0 ≤ ϕi ψi ≤ m0
Here, i0 and m0 are special reserved nominals and co-nominals, respectively. The first approximation step gives rise to
systems of inequalities {i0 ≤ ϕ, ψ ≤ m0}. Each such system is called an initial system, and is now passed on to the
reduction–elimination cycle (phase 2).
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6.2. Phase 2: the reduction–elimination cycle
The goal of the reduction–elimination cycle is to eliminate all propositional variables from the systems which it
receives from the preprocessing phase. The elimination of each variable is effected by an application of one of the
Ackermann rules given below. In order to apply an Ackermann rule, the systemmust have a specific shape; the residuation,
approximation, and splitting rules are used to transform systems into this shape. The rules of the reduction–elimination
cycle, namely the residuation, approximation, splitting, and Ackermann rules, will be collectively called the reduction
rules.
Residuation rules. The fact that all the operations in our signature are either right or left adjoints provides us with the third
batch of invertible rules for our algorithm, the residuation rules:
α ∧ β ≤ γ
α ≤ β → γ
α ≤ β ∨ γ
α − β ≤ γ
✸α ≤ β
α ≤ β
α ≤ ✷β
_α ≤ β
✁α ≤ β
Jβ ≤ α
α ≤ ✄β
β ≤ Iα
Approximation rules. The second batch consists of the approximation rules. These rules are based on the fact that in perfect
DMA’s each element is the join of join-primes and themeet of meet-primes, on the infinitary distribution properties of DMA
operations, and on the defining property of completely join-prime and meet-prime elements, respectively.
i ≤ ✸α
j ≤ α i ≤ ✸j
✷α ≤ m
α ≤ n ✷n ≤ m
i ≤ ✁α
α ≤ m i ≤ ✁m
✄α ≤ m
i ≤ α ✄ i ≤ m
The nominals and co-nominals introduced in the conclusions of the approximation rules must be fresh, in the sense that
they may not occur anywhere in the system before the rule is applied.
Remark 6.1. As regards the rules, we note the following:
1. The application of a rule replaces in the system the premise with the conclusion(s).
2. Although the rules are invertible, for the sake of reducing the Sahlqvist and inductive inequalities in DML we will only
ever need to apply them from top to bottom (Theorem 10.11).
3. In all rules that deal with the order-preserving operations, the displayed subformula does not change sides in the
inequality, whereas it does change sides in all the rules dealing with the order-reversing operations.
4. The monotone and antitone variable elimination rules are applied only during preprocessing. This is sufficient because,
thanks to what was observed in the item 3 above, the polarities of variable occurrences stay constant during
the reduction–elimination phase, and hence no new monotone or antitone variables can be created during this
phase.
5. As observed in Subsection 3.4, the lattice operations∨ and∧ respectively are the left and the right adjoint of the diagonal
map. Hence, the splitting rules are in fact ‘adjunction rules’, i.e. enhanced residuation rules. The enhanced power that
they have is that, by splitting, they break dependencies between variables caused by co-occurrences within the same
inequality.
Remark 6.2. In signatures containing operations and their residuals as primitives, the (invertible) residuation rules will
generally need to be applied in both directions, even for reducing inductive inequalities (see Example 7.5). This would be
the case for example in IML, containing ∧ and→, and in tense logic containing ✷F and ✸P .
In the case of IML we would also need to add approximation rules for→, namely
α → β ≤ m
j ≤ α j→ β ≤ m
α → β ≤ m
β ≤ n α → n ≤ m
where j and n are a fresh nominal and co-nominal, respectively.
The Ackermann rules. These two rules are responsible for the elimination of propositional variables, and as such they form
the heart of ALBA. Unlike that of the residuation and approximation rules, which apply to single inequalities, the applicability
of Ackermann rules is determined by the shape of the whole system, and multiple inequalities are removed or transformed
by a single application.
The right-handed Ackermann ruleworks as follows:
The system

α1 ≤ p
...
αn ≤ p
β1 ≤ γ1
...
βm ≤ γm
is replaced by

β1((α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αn)/p) ≤ γ1((α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αn)/p)
...
βm((α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αn)/p) ≤ γm((α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αn)/p)
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where:
1. p does not occur in α1, . . . , αn;
2. each βi is positive, and each γi negative in p, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
The left-handed Ackermann ruleworks as follows:
The system

p ≤ α1
...
p ≤ αn
β1 ≤ γ1
...
βm ≤ γm
is replaced by

β1((α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn)/p) ≤ γ1((α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn)/p)
...
βm((α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn)/p) ≤ γm((α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αn)/p)
where:
1. p does not occur in α1, . . . , αn;
2. each βi is negative, and each γi positive in p, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Remark 6.3. It is interesting to note that the monotone and antitone variable elimination rules can be seen as encoding
special instances of the Ackermann rules. Indeed, adding the tautological inequalities⊥ ≤ p or p ≤ ⊤ to any system always
preserves equivalence. Thus if {si ≤ ti} is positive in p we can equivalently replace it with {si ≤ ti} ∪ {⊥ ≤ p} obtaining
a system to which the right Ackermann rule is applicable to eliminate p. Likewise systems which are negative in p can be
brought into a shape to which the left Ackermann rule is applicable by adding p ≤ ⊤.
6.3. Phase 3: success, failure, translation, and output
If there was some system in phase 2 from which all occurring propositional variables could not be eliminated through
the application of the reduction rules, then ALBA reports failure and terminates.
Otherwise, each system {i0 ≤ ϕi, ψi ≤ m0} obtained fromψi ≤ ψi ∈ Preprocess(ϕ ≤ ψ) has been reduced to a system,
which we will indicate with Reduce(ϕi ≤ ψi), containing no propositional variables.
Let ALBA(ϕ ≤ ψ) be the set of quasi-inequalities8 &Reduce(ϕi ≤ ψi) ⇒ i0 ≤ m0 for ϕi ≤ ψi ∈ Preprocess(ϕ ≤ ψ).
Since all members of ALBA(ϕ ≤ ψ) are free of propositional variables, applying the standard frame translation to them
produces first-order formulas. Hence, let
ALBAFO(ϕ ≤ ψ) :=

i∈I
∀m0∀j∀m (∀xSTx(Reduce(ϕi ≤ ψi))→ ∀xSTx(i0 ≤ m0)) ,
where j and m are the vectors of all variables corresponding to the nominals and co-nominals, respectively, occurring in
Reduce(ϕi ≤ ψi), other than the reserved nominal and co-nominal i0 and m0. Note that the variable m0 corresponding to
m0 is quantified over but that i0 corresponding to i0 is left free— this is done sincewewant to produce a local correspondent.
That ALBAFO(ϕ ≤ ψ) is indeed a local frame correspondent for ϕ ≤ ψ is the content of Theorem 8.1 which will be proven
in Section 8.
ALBA returns ALBAFO(ϕ ≤ ψ) or ALBA(ϕ ≤ ψ), depending on the user’s preference, and terminates.
An inequality ϕ ≤ ψ on which ALBA succeeds will be called an ALBA inequality.
7. Examples
We will now illustrate how ALBA computes frame equivalents for inequalities by means of a few examples.
Example 7.1. Consider the Sahlqvist inequality ✸✷p ≤ ✷✸p. Steps 1, 2 and 3 of the preprocessing phase are trivial for this
inequality as the inequality is neither positive nor negative in p, and no distribution or splitting is possible. Hence, the first
approximation rule is applied and one initial system (10) is produced:
j0 ≤ ✸✷p, ✷✸p ≤ m0 . (10)
The reduction–elimination cycle now starts. Applying the approximation for ✸ to j0 ≤ ✸✷p produces the system (11), from
which (12) is obtained by the application of the residuation rule for ✷.
j0 ≤ ✸j1, ✷✸p ≤ m0
j1 ≤ ✷p

. (11)
j0 ≤ ✸j1, ✷✸p ≤ m0
_j1 ≤ p

. (12)
8 For the definition, see the paragraph right before Subsection 2.2, and the paragraph right before Subsubsection 2.5.1.
W. Conradie, A. Palmigiano / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (2012) 338–376 357
System (12)) is now in a shape which makes the right-handed Ackermann rule applicable. This application eliminates p and
yields the following:
j0 ≤ ✸j1, ✷✸_j1 ≤ m0 . (13)
As all propositional variables have been eliminated, this marks the end of the reduction–elimination phase. We now have
Reduce(✸✷p ≤ ✷✸p) = {j0 ≤ ✸j1, ✷✸_j1 ≤ m0} and, hence, ALBA(✸✷p ≤ ✷✸p) = {((j0 ≤ ✸j1) & (✷✸_j1 ≤ m0)) ⇒
j0 ≤ m0}. Further,
ALBAFO(✸✷p ≤ ✷✸p) (14)
=∀m0∀j1

∀x
 j0 ≤ x → ∃y(R✸xy ∧ j1 ≤ y)
∧
∀z(R✷xz → ∃u(R✸zu ∧ ∃v(R✷vu ∧ j1 ≤ v)))→ x  m0

→ ∀x(j0 ≤ x → x  m0). (15)
Now, on classical frames, where the≤-relation is the identity and R✸ = R✷ = R, (15) can be simplified as follows:
∀m0∀j1(∀x[∃y(Rj0y ∧ j1 = y) ∧ (∀z(Rxz → ∃u(Rzu ∧ Rj1u))→ x ≠ m0)] → j0 ≠ m0) (16)
≡∀m0∀j1∃x(Rj0j1 → (j0 = m0 → ∀z(Rxz → ∃u(Rzu ∧ Rj1u)) ∧ x = m0)) (17)
≡∀j1(Rj0j1 → ∀z(Rj0z → ∃u(Rzu ∧ Rj1u))), (18)
which defines the Church–Rosser confluence property, as expected.
Example 7.2. Consider the inductive inequality ✷(✁q∨ p)∧✷q ≤ ✸(p∧ q) from Example 3.3. Recall also from Example 3.6
that this is not a Sahlqvist inequality. As in the previous example, no distribution, splitting or variable elimination rules are
applicable during preprocessing. The preprocessing phase produces one initial system, namely,
j0 ≤ ✷(✁q ∨ p) ∧ ✷q, ✸(p ∧ q) ≤ m0 .
Applying the ∧-splitting rule produces
j0 ≤ ✷(✁q ∨ p), ✸(p ∧ q) ≤ m0
j0 ≤ ✷q

,
and the ✷-residuation rule transforms this into
_j0 ≤ ✁q ∨ p, ✸(p ∧ q) ≤ m0
_j0 ≤ q

.
Applying the ∨-residuation rule yields
_j0 − ✁q ≤ p, ✸(p ∧ q) ≤ m0
_j0 ≤ q

,
to which the right-handed Ackermann rule is now applicable to eliminate (e.g.) p, giving
_j0 ≤ q, ✸((_j0 − ✁q) ∧ q) ≤ m0 .
Applying again the right-handed Ackermann rule to eliminate q yields
✸((_j0 − ✁(_j0)) ∧ (_j0)) ≤ m0 .
Thus, as all propositional variables have been eliminated, the reduction–elimination cycle terminates successfully, yielding
Reduce(✷(✁q ∨ p) ∧ ✷q ≤ ✸(p ∧ q)) = {✸((_j0 − ✁(_j0)) ∧ (_j0)) ≤ m0}. Hence,
ALBA(✷(✁q ∨ p) ∧ ✷q ≤ ✸(p ∧ q)) = {(✸((_j0 − ✁(_j0)) ∧ (_j0)) ≤ m0)⇒ j0 ≤ m0},
from which ALBAFO(✷(✁q ∨ p) ∧ ✷q ≤ ✸(p ∧ q)) can be straightforwardly, if somewhat laboriously, computed.
Example 7.3. Consider the inequality ✷(✁q∨ p) ≤ ✸p, which is positive in q; by applying the monotone–antitone variable
elimination rule it transforms into ✷(✁⊥∨ p) ≤ ✸p. The first approximation rule now yields
j0 ≤ ✷(✁⊥∨ p), ✸p ≤ m0 ;
on applying the appropriate residuation rules, this system is rewritten as
_j0 − ✁⊥ ≤ p, p ≤ m0 ,
to which either Ackermann rule can be applied to eliminate p, giving
{_j0 − ✁⊥ ≤ m0} .
Alternatively q could also have been eliminated from the system by adding the tautological inequality⊥ ≤ q and applying
the right Ackermann rule, as discussed in Remark 6.3.
358 W. Conradie, A. Palmigiano / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (2012) 338–376
Example 7.4. As specified, ALBA is amenable to various enhancements extending its range, through the addition of extra
reduction rules. In the present examplewewill showhowALBA can bemade to successfully compute a frame correspondent
for the non-inductive IML inequality ✷((✷p → q) ∧ (q → ✷p)) ≤ p from Example 3.16. Indeed, the preprocessing phase
produces one initial system
j0 ≤ ✷((✷p → q) ∧ (q → ✷p)), p ≤ m0 .
It is not difficult to see that solving first for pwould lead to failure, so let us first solve for q. Applying the ✷-residuation and
∧-splitting rules turns it into
_j0 ≤ ✷p → q, p ≤ m0
_j0 ≤ q → ✷p

,
to which the ∧-residuation rule is applicable (in the reversed direction), which produces
_j0 ∧ ✷p ≤ q, p ≤ m0
_j0 ≤ q → ✷p

,
to which the right-hand Ackermann rule is applicable, yielding
_j0 ≤ ((_j0 ∧ ✷p)→ ✷p), p ≤ m0 .
Now, (_j0 ∧ ✷p) → ✷p = ⊤ is a Heyting tautology. Allowing a rule that would implement this would change the above
system into
_j0 ≤ ⊤, p ≤ m0 .
The resulting inequalities are both negative (see Definition 4.1), and hencemonotone, in p. A rule legislating the substitution
of⊤ for p in such cases (and⊥ in cases where all inequalities are positive in p) is sound, and would yield
_j0 ≤ ⊤, ⊤ ≤ m0 .
Notice that, by definition, completelymeet-irreducible elements are never equal to⊤. Hence, the second inequality above is
always false. So, in accordance with what happens in the Boolean case for the classical projection of this example, the whole
systemand the input inequality are also always false, and hence canonical, x ≠ x being their first-order frame correspondent.
Example 7.5. Consider Frege inequality p → (q → r) ≤ (p → q)→ (p → r) from Example 3.16, which is an intuitionistic
tautology. The preprocessing phase produces one initial system
j0 ≤ p → (q → r), (p → q)→ (p → r) ≤ m0 .
We apply the→-approximation rule in the second coordinate to the second inequality to obtain
j0 ≤ p → (q → r), (p → q)→ n ≤ m0
p → r ≤ n

.
We apply the→-approximation rule in the first coordinate to p → r ≤ n to obtain
j0 ≤ p → (q → r), (p → q)→ n ≤ m0
i ≤ p i→ r ≤ n

.
Now we can apply the right Ackermann rule to eliminate p:
j0 ≤ i→ (q → r), (i→ q)→ n ≤ m0
i→ r ≤ n

.
Another application of the→-approximation rule in the first coordinate, this time to (i→ q)→ n ≤ m0, yields
j0 ≤ i→ (q → r), k→ n ≤ m0
k ≤ i→ q i→ r ≤ n

.
Applying the ∧-residuation rule from bottom to top to k ≤ i→ q gives
j0 ≤ i→ (q → r), k→ n ≤ m0
k ∧ i ≤ q i→ r ≤ n

,
to which the right Ackermann rule can be applied, eliminating q:
j0 ≤ i→ ((k ∧ i)→ r), k→ n ≤ m0
i→ r ≤ n

.
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Applying the ∧-residuation rule from bottom to top twice to j0 ≤ i → ((k ∧ i)→ r) gives (after applying properties of ∧
for readability)
j0 ∧ k ∧ i ≤ r, k→ n ≤ m0
i→ r ≤ n

.
A last application of the right Ackermann rule yields the pure system
k→ n ≤ m0 i→ (j0 ∧ k ∧ i) ≤ n .
Thus,
ALBA(p → (q → r) ≤ (p → q)→ (p → r))
= ∀j0∀m0∀k∀n∀i[(k→ n ≤ m0 & i→ (j0 ∧ k ∧ i) ≤ n)⇒ j0 ≤ m0]
≡ ∀j0∀k∀n∀i[i→ (j0 ∧ k ∧ i) ≤ n⇒ ∀m0[k→ n ≤ m0 ⇒ j0 ≤ m0]]
≡ ∀j0∀k∀n∀i[i→ (j0 ∧ k ∧ i) ≤ n⇒ j0 ≤ k→ n]
≡ ∀j0∀k∀n∀i[i→ (j0 ∧ k ∧ i) ≤ n⇒ j0 ∧ k ≤ n]
≡ ∀j0∀k∀i[j0 ∧ k ≤ i→ (j0 ∧ k ∧ i)]
≡ ∀j0∀k∀i[j0 ∧ k ∧ i ≤ j0 ∧ k ∧ i]
≡ ⊤.
Example 7.6. Consider the inequality ✷(✁q ∨ p) ≤ ✸(✄q ∧ p). No distribution, splitting or variable elimination rules are
applicable during preprocessing. The preprocessing phase produces one initial system, namely
j0 ≤ ✷(✁q ∨ p), ✸(✄q ∧ p) ≤ m0 .
It is not difficult to see that the system can not be brought into a shape towhich one of the Ackermann rules is applicablewith
respect to q — notice that no occurrence of q can be ‘surfaced’ by applying reduction rules. However, it can be transformed
into the following Ackermann form:
_j0 − ✁q ≤ p, p ≤ ✄q → m0 ,
to which either Ackermann rule can be applied to eliminate p, giving
{_j0 − ✁q ≤ ✄q → m0} ,
which leads to failure.
Example 7.7. Early on (cf. Subsection 3.4 andRemark 6.2),we discussed howALBA can bemodified and adapted syntactically
to different logics; we conclude this section with an example illustrating how to adapt ALBA to different semantic
contexts. Some aspects of the discussion which will follow are relevant to the open questions raised in [27, Section
3], where analogous developments are discussed from a model-theoretic viewpoint. In particular, in [27, Section 3.2]
correspondence is considered for some formulas belonging to the implicative fragment of intuitionistic logic, including
Pierce’s law ((p → q) → p) → p, and for relevant implication interpreted on ternary frames. The implicit assumption
of that discussion is that correspondence theory should be developed from scratch in each of these contexts. In fact,
the algebraic approach of this paper makes possible a unification of what would otherwise be different correspondence
theories. Indeed, the ALBA reduction/elimination steps are sound in the setting of perfect distributive lattice expansions,
which can be characterized in purely algebraic terms and independently of their dual concrete incarnations as relational
structures; the outcome of the reduction/elimination process can be then further translated so as to fit different relational
environments. To illustrate this concretely, let us consider Pierce’s law: as the reader can easily check, feeding (p →
q) → p ≤ p to ALBA produces ∀j∀m[j ≤ (m → ⊥) → m ⇒ j ≤ m], which can be further reduced
to ∀m[(m → ⊥) → m ≤ m]. Let us now interpret it on partial orders (with up-sets interpreting formulas):
∀m[(m→⊥)→ m ≤ m] iff ∀w[((w↓c ∩ ∅c)↓c ∩ w↓cc)↓c ⊆ w↓c]
iff ∀w[w↓ ⊆ ((w↓c ∩ ∅c)↓c ∩ w↓)↓] iff ∀w[w↓ ⊆ ((w↓c)↓c ∩ w↓)↓]
iff ∀w[w ∈ ((w↓c)↓c ∩ w↓)↓] iff ∀w∃u[w ≤ u & u ∈ (w↓c)↓c ∩ w↓)]
iff ∀w∃u[w ≤ u & u ≤ w & u ∈ (w↓c)↓c] iff ∀w[w ∈ (w↓c)↓c]
iff ∀w[w /∈ (w↓c)↓] iff ∀w∀v[v /∈ w↓ ⇒ w ≰ v]
iff ∀w∀v[v ≰ w ⇒ w ≰ v] iff ∀w∀v[w ≤ v ⇒ v ≤ w].
Thus, as discussed in [27, Example 78], we see that Pierce’s law takes us to classical propositional logic, by constraining the
ordering on intuitionistic frames to be discrete.
Pierce’s law (aswell as any other axiom in the implicative fragment of intuitionistic logic) can be alternatively interpreted
on ternary frames, as they are defined e.g. in [20], where a Kripkean semantics is employed for the non-associative Lambek
calculus, and a restricted Sahlqvist theorem is proven. A suitably modified version of ALBA can be applied to the Lambek
calculus as well, so as to greatly improve the Sahlqvist theorem in [20], but this is discussed in [7]. Here, we limit ourselves
to discussing the correspondence of the Pierce’s axiom on ternary frames. A ternary frame (cf. [20, Definition 1]) is a structure
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(W , R) such thatW is a nonempty set and R is a ternary relation onW . For all X, Y ⊆ W , let R[Y , X] = {z | ∃x∃y[x ∈ Y & y ∈
X & R(xyz)]}. Implication can be interpreted on ternary frames as follows: for all X, Y ⊆ W ,
X =⇒ Y = {z | ∀x∀y[(R(xyz) & y ∈ X)⇒ x ∈ Y ]} = R[Y c, X]c .
Valuations send proposition letters to arbitrary subsets of the universe of ternary frames. Thus, for the purpose of this
example we let the complex algebra of the ternary frame (W , R) be the perfect implicative algebra (P (W ),∅,=⇒). As
to the expanded language, =⇒ is the right adjoint in its second coordinate to the binary connective • (fusion), defined by
Y • Z := {x | ∃y∃z[y ∈ Y & z ∈ Z & R(x, y, z)]}; nominals and co-nominals range as usual in the set of the completely
join-prime and meet-prime elements of the complex algebra, which in this case coincide with the sets of its atoms and of
its co-atoms respectively. Now let us consider Pierce’s law, interpreted with this semantics. As before, ALBA reduces it to
∀m[(m → ⊥) → m ≤ m], and up to this point, the reduction proceeds in exactly the same way as in the previous case;
this is sound because complex algebras both of this interpretation and of the previous one are based on perfect distributive
lattices. Let us abuse notation and writewc for {w}c = W \ {w}. Now,
∀m[(m→⊥)→ m ≤ m] iff ∀w[R[wcc, R[∅c, wc]c]c ⊆ wc]
iff ∀w[w ∈ R[{w}, R[W , wc]c]] iff ∀w∃x∃y[R(xyw) & y ∈ R[W , wc]c & x = w]
iff ∀w∃y[R(wyw) & y ∈ R[W , wc]c] iff ∀w∃y[R(wyw) & ∀x∀z[R(xzy)⇒ z = w]].
Notice that, in the more familiar case in which fusion coincides with meet, the ternary relation which dually represents the
binary map given by (U, V ) → U ∩ V is R = {(x, x, x) | x ∈ W }; in this case, X =⇒ Y reduces to the classical X c ∪ Y and
the first-order clause above is always true.
8. Correctness of ALBA
In this section we prove that ALBA is correct, in the sense that whenever it succeeds in eliminating all propositional
variables from an inequality ϕ ≤ ψ , the first-order formula returned is locally equivalent on DML frames to ϕ ≤ ψ .
Fix a DML frameF = (W ,≤, R✸, R✷, R✁, R✄, ) and a statew ∈ W . For any ξ ∈ L+term ∪L+ ∪L+quasi, we use the notation
F (j0 := w↑)  ξ to indicate that F , V  ξ for all valuations V which send the nominal variable j0 to w↑ — a type of
parametrized validity. For two valuations V and V ′, we will also write V ={j0,m0} V ′ to indicate that V (j0) = V ′(j0) and
V (m0) = V ′(m0). We first give the statement of the correctness theorem and its proof, and subsequently prove the two
lemmas needed in the proof.
Theorem 8.1 (Correctness). If ALBA succeeds in reducing an inequality ϕ ≤ ψ and yields ALBA(ϕ ≤ ψ), then F , w  ϕ ≤ ψ
iff F (j0 := w↑)  ALBA(ϕ ≤ ψ) iff F |= ALBAFO(ϕ ≤ ψ)[j0 := w].
Proof. Consider the chain of statements (19) to (24) below. Note that (22) is by definition equivalent to F , w  ALBA(ϕ ≤
ψ). The proof will be complete if we can show that (19) to (24) are equivalent.
F , w  ϕ ≤ ψ (19)
F , w  Preprocess(ϕ ≤ ψ) (20)
F (j0 := w↑)  (j0 ≤ ϕ′ & ψ ′ ≤ m0)⇒ j0 ≤ m0 for all ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′ ∈ Preprocess(ϕ ≤ ψ) (21)
F (j0 := w↑)  Reduce(ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′)⇒ j0 ≤ m0 for all ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′ ∈ Preprocess(ϕ ≤ ψ) (22)
F |= ∀m0∀j∀m
∀xSTx(Reduce(ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′))→ ∀xSTx(j0 ≤ m0) [j0 := w] (23)
for all ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′ ∈ Preprocess(ϕ ≤ ψ), and where j andm are the vectors of all nominals
and co-nominals, respectively, occurring in Reduce(ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′)
F |= ALBAFO(ϕ ≤ ψ)[j0 := w]. (24)
The equivalence between (19) and (20) is given by Lemma 8.3. The implication from (20) to (21) is immediate, while for
the converse we may argue as follows: Suppose that for some inequality ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′ ∈ Preprocess(ϕ ≤ ψ) and some
valuation V on F , (F , V ), w ̸ ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′. Then w ∈ V (ϕ′) but w ∉ V (ψ ′), i.e., w↑ ⊆ V (ϕ′) but w↑ ⊈ V (ψ ′). But then
w↑ ≰{b ∈ M∞ | V (ψ ′) ≤ b}. But this is the case iff there exists b0 ∈ {b ∈ M∞ | V (ψ ′) ≤ b} such thatw↑ ≰ b0. Then the
valuationV ′ obtained as the {j0,m0}-variant ofV which sends j0 tow↑ andm0 to b0 falsifies (j0 ≤ ϕ′&ψ ′ ≤ m0)→ j0 ≤ m0
on F (j0 := w↑).
Now for the bi-implication between (21) and (22). Assume (21), and let V be any valuation such that V (j0) = w↑ and
F , V  Reduce(ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′). Since Reduce(ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′) is obtained from {j0 ≤ ϕ′, ψ ′ ≤ m0} by the application of reduction
rules, it follows from Lemma 8.4.2 that there is a valuation V ′ ={j0,m0} V such that F , V ′  {j0 ≤ ϕ′, ψ ′ ≤ m0} and hence,
by (21), that F , V ′  j0 ≤ m0. Lastly, since V ′ ={j0,m0} V we have F , V  j0 ≤ m0. The proof of the implication from (22)
to (21) is symmetric if one uses Lemma 8.4.1.
Lastly, the bi-implication between (22) and (23) follows by Lemma 2.17, while that between (23) and (24) follows by the
definition of ALBAFO(ϕ ≤ ψ). 
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Remark 8.2. It must be pointed out that the proof of the equivalence of (19) to (22) given in the proof of Theorem 8.1 goes
through almost unaltered for descriptive frames G (and hence admissible valuations) instead of frames F . Indeed, as far as
the lemmas used in the proof are concerned, Lemma 8.3 holds for all DMA’s and hence for all descriptive frames, while cases
treated for the residuation and approximation rules in Lemma 8.4 go through unchanged. The only problem is the case for
the justification for the Ackermann rule. This rule is clearly sound on descriptive frames, but it is in general not invertible.
We will need special restricted versions of the Ackermann lemmas for this rule (Lemmas 9.3 and 9.4, below).
Lemma 8.3. Assume that a set of L-inequalities S ′ is obtained from a set S by the application of preprocessing rules. Then
F , w  S iff F , w  S ′.
Proof. It is sufficient to check that validity is invariant under the application of each preprocessing rule. For the distribution
and splitting rules this is immediate by the semantics of L. As for the monotone variable elimination rule, suppose
α(p) ≤ β(p) is positive (cf. Definition 4.1) in p. Given a valuation V on F , let V0 ∼p V be the p-variant of V sending p to ∅.
Then, by the monotonicity of α(p) ≤ β(p) in p, we have that (F , V0), w  α(p) ≤ β(p) implies (F , V ), w  α(p) ≤ β(p).
Also, (F , V0), w  α(p) ≤ β(p) iff (F , V ), w  α(⊥) ≤ β(⊥). Hence, F , w  α(⊥) ≤ β(⊥) implies F , w  α(p) ≤ β(p).
Conversely, F , w  α(p) ≤ β(p) clearly implies (F , V0), w  α(p) ≤ β(p), which is equivalent to (F , V ), w  α(⊥) ≤
β(⊥). The case of the antitone variable elimination rule is dual. 
Lemma 8.4. Let S be a finite system of inequalities and S ′ a system of inequalities obtained from S through the application of
reduction rules, and let V be any valuation. Then
1. if F , V  S then F , V ′  S ′ for some valuation V ′ ={j0,m0} V , and
2. if F , V  S ′ then F , V ′  S for some valuation V ′ ={j0,m0} V .
Proof. By the transitivity of the ={j0,m0}-relation, it suffices to check that the claim holds in the special case in which S ′ is
obtained from S by a single application of a rule.
The cases for the residuation rules follow from the fact that, for any inequality ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′ obtained from ϕ ≤ ψ by the
application of a residuation rule, F , V  ϕ ≤ ψ iff F , V  ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′, for any valuation V , as justified in Subsection 2.5.
As for the approximation rules, the quickest way to verify that these rules preserve the desired equivalence is to think
of them in the setting of the complex algebra F +. Recall that this is a perfect DMA with sets J∞ andM∞ of join-prime and
meet-prime elements, respectively.
✸-approximation rule: we have that V (i) ≤ ⟨R✸⟩V (ϕ) iff V (i) ≤ ⟨R✸⟩{a ∈ J∞ | a ≤ V (ϕ)} iff V (i) ≤ {⟨R✸⟩(a) | a ∈
J∞, a ≤ V (ϕ)}. SinceV (i) is join-prime, the latter is the case iffV (i) ≤ ⟨R✸⟩(a0) for some a0 ∈ {a ∈ J∞ | a ≤ V (ϕ)}.
We can thus take V ′ to be the j-variant of V such that V ′(j) = a0. Since the nominal j introduced by the rule must
be new, j is different from j0 (and from the co-nominalm0), and hence, V ={j0,m0} V ′.
To prove the second item, suppose that V (j) ≤ V (ϕ) and V (i) ≤ ⟨R✸⟩V (j). But then, by the monotonicity of
⟨R✸⟩, we have V (i) ≤ ⟨R✸⟩V (ϕ). Hence, we can take V ′ = V .
✷-approximation rule: the proof is order dual to the proof of the ✸-approximation rule.
✁-approximation rule: let us abbreviate ⟨R✁] as ✁. We have that V (i) ≤ ✁V (ϕ) iff V (i) ≤ ✁{b ∈ M∞ | V (ϕ) ≤ b}. The
latter is the case iff V (i) ≤ {✁b | b ∈ M∞, V (ϕ) ≤ b}. Now since V (i) is join-prime, the latter is the case iff
there exists b0 ∈ M∞ such that V (ϕ) ≤ b0 and V (i) ≤ ✁b0. The desired valuation V ′ can then be taken to be the
m-variant of V which sendsm to (the up-set corresponding to) b0.
To prove the second item, suppose that V is such that V (ϕ) ≤ V (m) and V (i) ≤ V (✁m). Then, by the
antitonicity of ✁, it follows that V (i) ≤ V (✁ϕ). V ′ can thus be taken to be V .
✄-approximation rule: the proof is order dual to the proof of the ✁-approximation rule.
The cases for the Ackermann rules are given by Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3. 
9. Canonicity
In this section, we will show that every L-inequality ϕ ≤ ψ on which ALBA succeeds is locally d-persistent, and hence
canonical. For the rest of this section, fix a descriptive general frame G = (F , τ ), and with A the DML algebra of clopen
upsets of τ (Definition 2.8). Our strategy will be to prove ‘‘canonicity via correspondence’’, and can be summarized as
follows: we know from Theorem 8.1 that G♯, w  ϕ ≤ ψ iff G♯(j0 := w↑)  Reduce(ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′) ⇒ j0 ≤ m0 for all
ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′ ∈ Preprocess(ϕ ≤ ψ). By the assumption of success, the (ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′)’s are pure, and because, as far as pure
formulas are concerned, there is no difference between admissible and arbitrary valuations, this transfers to G, yielding
G(j0 := w↑)  Reduce(ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′) ⇒ j0 ≤ m0. Hence, if we could prove the equivalence of (19) to (22), but replacing F
with G, we would be done. As already indicated in Remark 8.2, the proof of Theorem 8.1 would serve almost unchanged,
except Ackermann’s lemmas. Indeed, consider for instance the proof of the right Ackermann’s lemma.While the implication
from bottom to top stands as it is when relativized to admissible valuations, for the implication from top to bottom we are
in trouble: indeed we are not able to guarantee that V ′(p) := V (ni=1 αi) gives an admissible valuation. This is because the
αi are terms in the expanded languageL+, and therefore may contain nominals, co-nominals, or adjoint operations, under
which the subalgebraA of the admissible sets is not in general closed. So, in order for the proof to go through,wewould need
362 W. Conradie, A. Palmigiano / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (2012) 338–376
sω + 1
☛sω ✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑✑✸
R✁
s2 ✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁✕
R✁
s1❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆❑
R✁
s0◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗◗❦
R✁
’
&
$
%
transitive
· · · ✲ ✲
■
Fig. 1. Unlabelled arrows belong to both R✸ and R✁ .
to be able to produce a suitable admissible subset P ∈ A, large enough to contain V (ni=1 αi), but approximating V (ni=1 αi)
accurately enough so as not to destroy the satisfaction of the inequality β(α) ≤ γ (α), when the term α is ‘collapsed’ to the
variable p, and evaluated as P . This is a non-trivial demand, and it is not always possible to meet it, as is illustrated in the
following example.
Example 9.1. Let α := q, β(p) = p and γ (p) = Jp and consider the descriptive general frame G = (F , τ ) where
F = (W ,=, R✸, R✁) is the frame pictured in Fig. 1. HereW = N ∪ {ω,ω + 1}; R✸ is {(ω + 1, ω), (ω, ω)} ∪ {(ω, n) | n ∈
N} ∪ {(n,m) | n,m ∈ N, n ≥ m}; R✁ = R✸ ∪ {(n, ω + 1) | n ∈ N} ∪ {(ω, ω + 1)}. Let τ be the topology with a basis of
clopens A, where A = {X1 ∪ X2 ∪ X3 | Xi ∈ Xi, i = 1, 2, 3}, where X1 contains all finite (possibly empty) sets of natural
numbers, X2 contains ∅ and all sets of the form {x ∈ N | n ≤ x ≤ ω} for all n ∈ ω, and X3 = {∅, {ω + 1}}.9 ThusA is the
set of admissible sets. It is not difficult to check that G is a descriptive general frame.
Let V (q) = N ∪ {ω}, which is admissible. Then V (α) = V (q) = {x | ∀y(yR✸x ⇒ y  q)} = W \ {ω} /∈ A, and
V (q) = {x | ∀y(yR✸x ⇒ y ∈ V (q))} = {ω + 1}. Also V (Jq) = {x | ∃y(yR▹x & y ∉ V (q))} = {x | ωR▹x} = W , which
implies that G, V  β(α/p) ≤ γ (α/p). On the other hand, the only admissible p-variant V ′ of V such that G, V ′  α ≤ p,
i.e., such that V ′(α) = V (α) = W \ {ω} ⊆ V ′(p), is the one which sends p to W = ⊤. For this valuation, we have
V ′(β(p)) = ⊤ = ⊤, and V (γ (p)) = J⊤ = ⊥, and hence G, V ′ ̸ β(p) ≤ γ (p).
Example 9.1 shows that the right Ackermann lemma does not hold, as stated, on descriptive general frames. Analogous
considerations apply to the left Ackermann lemma. On the other hand, as we will see, restricted versions of the Ackermann
lemmas do hold for descriptive general frames, which require restrictive assumptions on the syntactic shape of the α’s, β ’s,
and γ ’s. These restrictions are designed to make crucial use of the topo-algebraic notion of compactness so as to guarantee
the existence of a suitable admissible approximating subset as outlined in the discussion above. The technical details of this
will become clear later; to set the stage, we need to introduce the following notions:
Definition 9.2. An L+term-formula is syntactically closed if, in it, all occurrences of nominals, J, _ and − are positive, while
all occurrences of co-nominals, I, , and→ are negative.
Similarly, an L+term-formula is syntactically open if, in it, all occurrences of nominals, J, _, and − are negative, while all
occurrences of co-nominals, I, , and→ are positive.
Note that ϕ is syntactically closed iff ✁ϕ, ✄ϕ, and Iϕ are syntactically open. Also, ϕ is syntactically open iff ✁ϕ, ✄ϕ, and
Jϕ are syntactically closed. Considering the binary operations − and→, the formula ϕ → ψ is syntactically open iff ϕ is
syntactically closed andψ is syntactically open;ϕ−ψ is syntactically closed iffϕ is syntactically closed andψ is syntactically
open.
The notions of syntactic openness and closedness enable us to formulate the following versions of theAckermann lemmas
that hold on descriptive frames. The proofs are highly technical and have been relegated to the appendix. The gist of the proof
is that, under any admissible valuation, the extension of any syntactically closed (open) formula is a closed (open) subset.
Thus, e.g., inequality (25) in Lemma 9.3 is interpreted as an inclusion of an intersection of admissible sets into a union of
admissible sets, to which inclusion compactness can be applied to obtain the admissible witness, as in the discussion above.
The notation used was introduced at the end of Section 2.5.1.
Lemma 9.3 (Right-handed Ackermann Lemma for Descriptive Frames). Let α be syntactically closed, p ∉ PROP(α), let β1(p),
. . . , βn(p) be syntactically closed and positive in p, and let γ1(p), . . . , γn(p) be syntactically open and negative in p. Let V be any
admissible valuation on G.
βi
V
p (α(V )) ≤ γiVp (α(V )), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (25)
iff there exists P ∈ A such that
α(V ) ≤ P and βiVp (P) ≤ γiVp (P), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
9 G is a variation of a (Boolean) general frame given in example 8.52 in [4].
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Lemma 9.4 (Left-handed Ackermann Lemma for Descriptive Frames). Let α be syntactically open, p ∉ PROP(α), let
β1(p), . . . , βn(p) be syntactically closed and negative in p, and let γ1(p), . . . , γn(p) be syntactically open and positive in p. Let
V be any admissible valuation on G. Then,
βi
V
p (α(V )) ≤ γiVp (α(V )), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
iff there exists P ∈ A such that
P ≤ α(V ) and βiVp (P) ≤ γiVp (P), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Lemma 9.5. In every non-pure inequality ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′ obtained when ALBA is run on an inequality ϕ ≤ ψ ∈ L, the left-hand side
ϕ′ is always syntactically closed while the right-hand side ψ ′ is always syntactically open.
Proof. Since ϕ ≤ ψ comes from the base languageL, it is immediate that ϕ and ψ are both syntactically open and closed.
Since preprocessing does not introduce any symbols not inL, the formulas ϕ′ andψ ′ are both syntactically open and closed,
for each inequality ϕ′ ≤ ψ ′ ∈ Preprocess(ϕ ≤ ψ). Applying the first approximation rule yields j0 ≤ ϕ′ and ψ ′ ≤ m0,
which clearly satisfy the requirements of the lemma. In order to complete the proof, it now remains to check that each
reduction rule preserves the desired syntactic shape. Since this is straightforward, we will only consider explicitly, by way
of illustration, the case for the right-hand Ackermann rule. This rule transforms a system
{α1 ≤ p, . . . , αn ≤ p, β1 ≤ γ1, . . . , βm ≤ γm}
into
{β1(α/p) ≤ γ1(α/p), . . . , βm(α/p) ≤ γm(α/p)},
where α = α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αn. Firstly, note that all the pure inequalities among the βi ≤ γi remain unaffected by the rule, and
hence remain pure. For non-pure βi ≤ γi, we have by assumption that βi is syntactically closed and positive in pwhile γi is
syntactically open and negative in p. Thus, inβi(α/p) each occurrence of a symbolwithin any occurrence of the subformulaα
has the same polarity as it had in α before substitution. Hence, since α is syntactically closed, βi(α/p) is syntactically closed.
Similarly, in γi(α/p) any occurrence of a symbol within each occurrence of the subformula α has the polarity opposite to
that which it had in α before substitution. Hence, γi(α/p) is syntactically open. 
Remark 9.6. Note that the restriction to non-pure inequalities in Lemma 9.5 is essential, since none of the pure inequalities
i ≤ ✸j, ✷n ≤ m, i ≤ ✁m, and ✄i ≤ m introduced by the approximation rules satisfies the requirement of the lemma.
For the rest of this subsection, also fix a statew in the descriptive frame G.
Theorem 9.7 (Correctness of ALBA on Descriptive Frames). If ALBA succeeds in reducing an inequality ϕ ≤ ψ ∈ L and yields
ALBA(ϕ ≤ ψ), then G, w  ϕ ≤ ψ iff G(j0 := w↑)  ALBA(ϕ ≤ ψ).
Proof. It has already been indicated in Remark 8.2 that the proof is essentially the same as that of Theorem 8.1. It was also
indicated that the only difficulty that arises in the case of descriptive frames is that the Ackermann rules are generally not
invertible on descriptive frames (Example 9.1). However, by Lemmas 9.3 and 9.4, in the special case where the left- and
right-hand sides of all inequalities involved in the application of an Ackermann rule are, respectively, syntactically closed
and open, the rule is sound and invertible on descriptive frames. But by Lemma 9.5 this requirement on the syntactic shape
is always satisfied when the rule is applied. 
Theorem 9.8. All ALBA inequalities are (locally) d-persistent, and hence canonical.
Proof. Let ϕ ≤ ψ be an ALBA inequality. Let Val and AdVal be the sets of all valuations and admissible valuation on G♯ and
G, respectively, and let Val(j0 := w) and AdVal(j0 := w) be the sets of all valuations and admissible valuation on G♯ and G
which send j0 tow↑, respectively. The proof is then summarized in the following U-shaped diagram:
G, w  ϕ ≤ ψ G♯, w  ϕ ≤ ψ
⇕ ⇕
G, V ′, w  ϕ ≤ ψ G♯, V , w  ϕ ≤ ψ
for all V ′ ∈ AdVal for all V ∈ Val
⇕ ⇕
G, V ′  ALBA(ϕ ≤ ψ), ⇔ G♯, V  ALBA(ϕ ≤ ψ),
for all V ′ ∈ AdVal(j0 := w) for all V ∈ Val(j0 := w)
The bi-implications on the uppermost level are given by the definitions of validity on descriptive frames and frames. Those
appearing one level down are given by Theorems 8.1 and 9.7. The horizontal bi-implication follows from the facts that,
by assumption, ALBA(ϕ ≤ ψ) is pure, and that, when restricted to pure formulas, the ranges of admissible and arbitrary
valuations coincide. 
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10. ALBA succeeds on inductive and Sahlqvist inequalities
In the present section we shall prove that all inductive and Sahlqvist inequalities are ALBA inequalities, and hence, in the
light of Theorems 8.1 and 9.8, that they are all elementary and canonical. Of course, it is sufficient to prove this result only
for the inductive inequalities, since they have the Sahlqvist inequalities as a proper subclass. However, since the Sahlqvist
inequalities are better known to most readers, and since they can be handled by a weaker version of ALBA, which uses only
a restricted subset of rules, we have decided to include a separate proof.
10.1. ALBA succeeds on all inductive inequalities
We will start with some preliminary definitions and lemmas which will be needed.
Definition 10.1. Given an order type ϵ ∈ {0, ∂}n, a signed generation tree ∗ϕ of a term ϕ(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ L+ is called ϵ-
conservative if all connectives occurring on ϵ-critical branches of ∗ϕ are from the base language L. In other words none of
_,,I, or Jmay occur on ϵ-critical branches.
The next definition extends the notion of inductive terms and inequalities to L+term and L+, essentially by keeping
Definition 3.1 intact and simply forbidding connectives belonging properly to the extended language on critical branches.
Nevertheless, since this definition will be used extensively, we write it out in full here.
Definition 10.2 ((Ω, ϵ)-inductiveL+ terms and inequalities). Given an order type ϵ and an irreflexive and transitive
relationΩ on the variables p1, . . . , pn, the generation tree ∗s, ∗ ∈ {−,+}, of a term s(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ L+term is (Ω, ϵ)-inductive
if
1. it is ϵ-conservative, and
2. for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, on every ϵ-critical branch with leaf labelled pi, every choice node c with a universal node as ancestor
is binary, and hence is labelled with ⋆(α ◦ β)where ⋆ ∈ {+,−}, and moreover:
(a) ϵ∂(⋆α), and
(b) pj <Ω pi for every pj occurring in α.
An inequality s ≤ t ∈ L+ is (Ω, ϵ)-inductive if the trees+s and−t are both (Ω, ϵ)-inductive.
Definition 10.3 (Definite (Ω, ϵ)-InductiveL+ Terms and Inequalities). Given an order type ϵ and an irreflexive and
transitive relationΩ on the variables p1, . . . , pn, a signed generation tree ∗s, ∗ ∈ {−,+}, of a term s(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ L+term, is
definite (Ω, ϵ)-inductive if
1. it is (Ω, ϵ)-inductive,
2. every binary choice node on an ϵ-critical branch with leaf pi satisfies conditions 2(a) and 2(b) of Definition 10.2, whether
it has a universal node as ancestor or not, and
3. no unary choice node on an ϵ-critical branch has a binary choice node as ancestor.
A term s ∈ L+term is definite (Ω, ϵ)-left inductive (resp., definite (Ω, ϵ)-right inductive) if +s (resp. −s) is definite (Ω, ϵ)
inductive. An inequality s ≤ t ∈ Lterm is definite (Ω, ϵ)-inductive if the trees+s and−t are both definite (Ω, ϵ)-inductive.
The definition of definite inductive inequalities is primarilymeant to capture the syntactic shape of inductive inequalities
after preprocessing (see Lemma10.4 below). Since exhaustive applications of the splitting rules are part of the preprocessing,
we could have then strengthened the definition above by also excluding binary choice nodes (+∨ and −∧) as roots of
generation trees. But we also want definiteness to capture a syntactic shape that results from preprocessing and which then
remains stable during the subsequent applications of the reduction rules (see Lemma 10.6). Since +∨ and −∧ nodes in
inductive formulas can occur in the scope of some universal nodes, they might ‘surface’ to the root of the generation tree
after some reduction rule applications, so by excluding this case we would lose the desired stability of definiteness under
reduction rules.
Lemma 10.4. Let {si ≤ ti} be the set of inequalities obtained by preprocessing an (Ω, ϵ)-inductive inequality s ≤ t ∈ L. Then
each si ≤ ti is a definite (Ω, ϵ)-inductive inequality.
Proof. We first prove that si ≤ ti is an (Ω, ϵ)-inductive inequality. It is sufficient to check that the application of
a distribution rule, splitting rule, monotone/antitone variable elimination rule to an (Ω, ϵ)-inductive inequality again
produces an (Ω, ϵ)-inductive inequality. To that end, suppose that s0 ≤ t0 is an (Ω, ϵ)-inductive inequality. If s0 ≤ t0
is of the form s1 ∨ s2 ≤ t0, the ∨-splitting rule is applicable and yields s1 ≤ t0 and s2 ≤ t0. We need to check that s1 and s2
are (Ω, ϵ)-left inductive. But any ‘bad’ path in the positive generation tree of s1 or s2 would also be bad in that of s1 ∨ s2;
hence, since s0 = s1∨s2 is (Ω, ϵ)-left inductive, we conclude that so are s1 and s2. The case for s0 ≤ t0 of the form s0 ≤ t1∧t2
and the ∧-splitting rule is similar.
Suppose next that a distribution rule was applied to a subformula of s0 (respectively, t0), with result s1 (respectively,
t1). There are six cases, corresponding to the different distribution rules, of which we will treat cases corresponding to
distribution over+∨, those for distribution over−∧ being similar:
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(a)
+α
+β +γ
+∨
+∧
+α +β +α +γ
+∧ +∧
+∨
+s0 /−t0 +s1 /−t1
(b) (c)
+s0 /−t0
+✸
+∨
+α +β
+s1 /−t1
+∨
+✸
+α
+✸
+β
+s0 /−t0
−✄
+∨
+α +β
+s1 /−t1
−∧
−✄ −✄
+α +β
Fig. 2. Distribution.
Case 1 A subformula α∧ (β∨γ )was replaced by (α∧β)∨ (α∧γ ). The effect of this on the generation tree is graphically
illustrated in Fig. 2(a).We claim that this could not have created any bad paths. Indeed, the subtrees corresponding
to α, β and γ remain unchanged. After distribution, all variable nodes in β and γ have the same ancestors in the
tree and in the same order, except for the fact that the order of a+∨-node and+∧-node has been swapped, which
cannot change a good path into a bad one. On all paths from variable nodes in α, a new choice node, namely+∨,
has been introduced. But by the assumptions on the application of distribution, this+∨-node was not, and hence
in the resulting tree is not, in the scope of any universal node. We conclude that no bad path from a variable node
in α could have been created by the distribution.
Case 2 A subformula ✸(α ∨ β) was replaced by ✸α ∨ ✸β . The corresponding generation trees are given in Fig. 2(b). The
only paths from variable nodes to the root of the distribution tree affected by this are those from variable nodes in
α and β . But on these paths all that has happened is that two consecutive choice nodes have been swapped. This
cannot introduce any bad paths.
Case 3 A subformula✄(α∨β)was replaced by✄α∧✄β . These generation trees are given in Fig. 2(c). Apart from the fact
that+∨ changes into−∧ the argument is the same as for case 2.
It should also be clear that none of the monotone/antitone variable elimination rules can destroy ϵ-inductiveness, since, by
eliminating variables, potential bad paths are eliminated, and certainly not introduced. Thus, having established that si ≤ ti
is an (Ω, ϵ)-inductive inequality, it only remains to show that it is definite. In the generation tree of+si, let us consider any
ϵ-critical branch and let c be the binary choice node closest to the root on this branch — if there are no binary choice nodes
on the branch there is nothing to prove. We claim that c satisfies condition 2 of Definition 10.2. If c is the root, it must be
+∨— it cannot be−∧ since we are considering the positive generation tree. But this cannot be the case, because otherwise
the∨-splitting rule would have been applied during the preprocessing to eliminate c . Thus, c cannot be the root. Therefore,
c must have a parent node in the tree. Since +si is (Ω, ϵ)-inductive, in order to prove our claim, it is enough to show that
c (being a binary choice node) is in the scope of some universal node. Suppose, to the contrary, that c is not in the scope of
any universal node; then the parent node of c must be either of the type+✸,−✄, or+∧ (in the case where c is+∨), or of
the type−✷,+✁, or−∨ (in the case where c is−∧). But once again this leads to a contradiction with the assumption that
preprocessing has been exhaustively performed upon si ≤ ti. We therefore conclude that c must have a universal node as
ancestor. As for the lower binary choice nodes on the same branch, they are already in the scope of universals, since c is (in
the scope of some universal); so the assumption of+si being (Ω, ϵ)-inductive again implies the claim also for these nodes.
Moreover, no unary choice node on the branch can be in the scope of a binary choice node. Indeed, c is the topmost binary
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choice node and is in the scope of a universal node, so any such unary choice node would be in the scope of c ’s universal
ancestor, contradicting the fact that+si is (Ω, ϵ)-inductive.
The case for the negative generation tree of ti is similar. 
Definition 10.5 (Definite Good Shape). An inequality s ≤ t ∈ L+ is in definite (Ω, ϵ)-good shape if either of the following
conditions hold:
1. s is pure,+t is definite (Ω, ϵ)-inductive and moreover, if+t contains a unary choice node on an ϵ-critical branch, then
s is a nominal.10
2. t is pure,−s is definite (Ω, ϵ)-inductive and moreover, if−s contains a unary choice node on an ϵ-critical branch, then
t is a co-nominal.
Clearly, if an inequality s ≤ t is definite (Ω, ϵ)-inductive, then the two inequalities obtained by applying the first
approximation rule to it are in definite (Ω, ϵ)-good shape. Next, we would like to prove a ‘good-shape lemma’ for definite
inductive inequalities. In particular, we would like to show that the application of the reduction rules does not spoil good
shape. Actually the application the following rules might spoil good shape:
x ∧ y ≤ z
x ≤ y → z
z ≤ y ∨ x
z − y ≤ x
This happens, e.g., when z is pure and y is not. A solution to this is provided by allowing only applications of the rules
above which are restricted to the cases in which the term y that switches sides is pure.
Lemma 10.6. If s ≤ t is in definite (Ω, ϵ)-good shape, then any inequality s′ ≤ t ′ obtained from s ≤ t, by either the application
of a splitting rule, of an approximation rule, or of a residuation rule for a unary connective from top to bottom, or of the restricted
application of a residuation rule for a binary connective from top to bottom, is again in definite (Ω, ϵ)-good shape.
Proof. We will only treat the case in which s ≤ t is such that s is pure and t is definite (Ω, ϵ)-left inductive, the other, in
which t is pure and s is definite (Ω, ϵ)-right inductive, being perfectly symmetric.
Wemay assume that the positive generation tree of t contains ‘critical’ nodes, i.e., nodes+pi such that ϵi = 1 or−pi such
that ϵi = ∂ . If not, the proof becomes trivial.
Which rule is applicable is determined by the root of the positive generation tree of t . If the root is universal, it must be
either +✷ or +✄, i.e., t is either of the form ✷t ′ or ✄t ′. In the first case, the ✷-residuation rule is the only applicable rule
and yields _s ≤ t ′. Now clearly _s contains no propositional variables and t ′ is definite (Ω, ϵ)-left inductive. Since _s is
not a nominal, to prove that_s ≤ t ′ is in definite (Ω, ϵ)-good shape, it remains to show that+t ′ contains no unary choice
node on an ϵ-critical branch. Indeed, if +t ′ contained such a node, that would imply the existence of a unary choice node
on an ϵ-critical branch in+t with a+✷-node as ancestor, contradicting the assumption that+t is (Ω, ϵ)-inductive. Hence,
_s ≤ t ′ is in definite (Ω, ϵ)-good shape.
In the second case, the inequality is of the form s ≤ ✄t ′, and the ✄-residuation rule is applicable and yields t ′ ≤ Js.
Clearly Js is pure. Note that the negative generation tree of t ′ is obtained by simply removing the root from the positive
generation tree of ✄t ′. Hence,−t ′ is definite (Ω, ϵ)-inductive. Further, as above, we can prove that−t cannot contain any
unary choice node on an ϵ-critical branch. Hence, we conclude that t ′ ≤ Js is in definite (Ω, ϵ)-good shape.
Next, consider the casewhere the root of+t is a choice node, i.e., it is either+∨,+✸, or+✁. If it is+∨, then+t = +t1∨t2.
Moreover, if the ∨-residuation is applicable in its restricted form, then (we can assume w.l.o.g. that) t1 is pure. So the rule
yields s − t1 ≤ t2. Clearly s − t1 is pure and t2 is definite (Ω, ϵ)-left inductive. Moreover, +t2 cannot contain a unary
choice node on an ϵ-critical branch, for in+t that unary choice node would have the binary choice node+∨ as an ancestor,
contradicting the fact that+t is definite (Ω, ϵ)-inductive.
If the root of +t is +✸ or +✁, then, because s ≤ t is in (Ω, ϵ)-good shape, we have that s = j for some nominal j. So
s ≤ t is either j ≤ ✸t ′ or j ≤ ✁t ′.
In the first case, application of the ✸-approximation rule replaces j ≤ ✸t ′ with the inequalities j ≤ ✸k and k ≤ t ′. It is
immediate that these equations are in definite (Ω, ϵ)-good shape.
In the second case, application of the ✁-approximation rule replaces j ≤ ✁t ′ with the inequalities t ′ ≤ m and j ≤ ✁m.
The latter, being pure, is trivially in (Ω, ϵ)-good shape. As above, the fact that−t ′ is definite (Ω, ϵ)-inductive follows from
the facts that +✁t ′ is definite (Ω, ϵ)-inductive and that −t ′ is obtained by deleting the root of +✁t ′. Hence, t ′ ≤ m is in
definite (Ω, ϵ)-good shape.
Lastly, s ≤ t can be of the form s ≤ t1 ∧ t2, to which the ∧-splitting rule applies, producing s ≤ t1 and s ≤ t2, for which
it is immediate that they are in definite (Ω, ϵ)-good shape. 
10 Note that the sides have been swapped around: we require that the right-hand side of the inequality must be left inductive. This is so because the first
approximation rule swaps the sides of inequalities.
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Definition 10.7 ((Ω, ϵ)-Ackermann Form). A set ofL+-inequalities {si ≤ ti}i∈I is in reduced 1-Ackermann form with respect
to a variable p if, for every i ∈ I , either
1. si is pure and ti = p, or
2. si is positive in p and ti is negative in p.
Similarly, the set {si ≤ ti}i∈I is in reduced ∂-Ackermann formwith respect to a variable p if, for every i ∈ I , either
1. si = p and ti is pure, or
2. si is negative in p and ti is positive in p.
Given an irreflexive, transitive orderingΩ on the variables p1, . . . , pn and an order type ϵ = (ϵ1, . . . , ϵn), a set {si ≤ ti}i∈I of
inequalities is in reduced (Ω, ϵ)-Ackermann form if it is in reduced ϵk-Ackermann form w.r.t. everyΩ-minimal variable pk.
The following two lemmas explore the consequences of a set of inequalities which are in definite (Ω, ϵ)-good shape not
being in (Ω, ϵ)-Ackermann form.
Lemma 10.8. 1. If a system {si ≤ ti}i∈I of L+-inequalities in (Ω, ϵ)-good shape is not in reduced 1-Ackermann form w.r.t.
some variable p, then one of the following condition holds for some i ∈ I:
(a) si is not positive in p, or
(b) ti ≠ p and ti is not negative in p.
2. If a system {si ≤ ti}i∈I of L+-inequalities in (Ω, ϵ)-good shape is not in reduced ∂-Ackermann form w.r.t. some variable p,
then one of the following condition holds for some i ∈ I:
(c) ti is not positive in p, or
(d) si ≠ p and si is not negative in p.
Proof. 1. It readily follows from Definition 10.7 that if {si ≤ ti}i∈I is not in reduced 1-Ackermann form w.r.t. p, then there
exists some i ∈ I such that (A ∨ B) ∧ (C ∨ D), where
A: = si is not pure. B: = ti ≠ p.
C: = si is not positive in p. D:= ti is not negative in p.
Hence, (A ∧ C) ∨ (A ∧ D) ∨ (B ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧ D). So it is enough to show that each of the disjuncts implies either (a) or (b).
Notice that if si is not positive in p, then si is not pure, so A ∧ C is equivalent to C , which is (a). B ∧ C implies C , which is (a).
B∧D is (b). Finally, if ti is not negative in p, then ti is not pure, so the assumption that si ≤ ti is in (Ω, ϵ)-good shape implies
that si is pure. Hence, A ∧ D cannot occur.
The proof of item 2 is similar. 
Corollary 10.9. If a system {si ≤ ti}i∈I ofL+-inequalities in (Ω, ϵ)-good shape is not in reduced (Ω, ϵ)-Ackermann form, then
one of the following conditions holds for some i ∈ I and someΩ-minimal propositional variable pj:
1. si is pure and ti contains a positive (negative) occurrence of pj where ϵj = 1 (ϵj = ∂), and ti ≠ pj, or
2. ti is pure and si contains a negative (positive) occurrence of pj where ϵj = 1 (ϵj = ∂), and si ≠ pj.
Proof. If {si ≤ ti}i∈I is not in reduced (Ω, ϵ)-Ackermann form, then either it is not in reduced 1-Ackermann form for some
Ω-minimal variable pj with ϵj = 1 or it is not in reduced ∂-Ackermann form for someΩ-minimal variable pj with ϵj = ∂ .
In the first case, Lemma 10.8 tells us that there exists an i ∈ I such that (a) si is not positive in pj, or (b) ti ≠ pj and ti is
not negative in pj. If (a), then si must contain a negative occurrence of pj, and hence, si ≠ pj. Further, since si is not pure, it
follows from the good shape of si ≤ ti that ti must be pure. Hence, we have shown (2). On the other hand, if (b), we have
that ti must contain a positive occurrence of pj and ti ≠ pj. Moreover, ti is not pure; hence, it follows from the good shape of
si ≤ ti that si must be pure. Hence, we have shown (1).
In the second case, Lemma 10.8 tells us that (c) ti is not positive in pj, or (d) si ≠ pj and si is not negative in pj. If (c), then
ti contains a negative occurrence of pj, and hence, ti ≠ pj. Moreover, since ti is not pure, it follows from the good shape of
si ≤ ti that si must be pure. Hence, we have shown (1). If (d), then si contains a positive occurrence of pj and si ≠ pj, and
since si is not pure, it follows from the good shape of si ≤ ti that ti must be pure. Hence, we have shown (2). 
Proposition 10.10. Any finite set {si ≤ ti}i∈I of inequalities which are in definite (Ω, ϵ)-good shape can be transformed into a
set {s′i ≤ t ′i }i∈I ′ which is in reduced (Ω, ϵ)-Ackermann form, through the exhaustive application, only to non-pure inequalities, of
the ∧-splitting, ∨-splitting, approximation, and unary residuation rules top to bottom, as well as the restricted application of the
binary residuation rules top to bottom.
Proof. We first claim that the process of applying the above mentioned rules to non-pure inequalities will eventually
terminate. Indeed, by the definition of definite (Ω, ϵ)-good shape, each inequality si ≤ ti in the initial set {si ≤ ti}i∈I
has at most one non-pure side, and by Lemma 10.6 the application of the rules does not change this situation. Next, note
that each rule application replaces an inequality with one or two inequalities in which the generation tree of the non-pure
side is of strictly smaller height. For instance, each residuation rule is always applied top to bottom, and therefore results
in a ‘black’ operation being introduced on the pure side and a ‘white’ operation being stripped off the non-pure side of the
inequality to which it is applied. Hence, the process must eventually terminate.
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Let {s′i ≤ t ′i }i∈I ′ be the set of inequalities obtainedwhen the process terminates; suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that
it is not in reduced (Ω, ϵ)-Ackermann form. Hence, by Corollary 10.9, one of the following is the case for someΩ-minimal
variable pj and some i ∈ I ′:
Case 1: si is pure and ti contains a positive (negative) occurrence of pj where ϵj = 1 (ϵj = ∂), and ti ≠ pj, or
Case 2: ti is pure and si contains a negative (positive) occurrence of pj where ϵj = 1 (ϵj = ∂), and si ≠ pj.
Suppose we are in case 1. The root of the positive generation tree of t ′i can be one of the following:+∧,+∨,+✸,+✄,+✷ or+✁. We will now show that each of these options leads to a contradiction with our assumptions. If the root were+∧,+✷
or+✄, then the ∧-splitting rule, the ✷-residuation rule or the ✁-residuation rule, respectively, would still be applicable to
the inequality, contrary to the assumption that the rules have been exhaustively applied.
If the root of+ti is+∨, then the shape of the offending inequality is s′i ≤ t ′1∨t ′2. Then if pj occurs in t ′2, the assumption that
pj isΩ-minimal and t ′i is in definite (Ω, ϵ)-good shape imply that t
′
1 is pure. Then a restricted application of ∨-residuation
would still be possible, contrary to the assumption that the rules have been exhaustively applied.
Thus, the only remaining options for the root of t ′i are+✸ and+✁. In both cases it is a choice node, and since the positive
generation tree of +t ′i contains a node +pj (−pj) with ϵj = 1 (ϵj = ∂), it follows from the fact that s′i ≤ t ′i is in definite
(Ω, ϵ)-good shape that s′i must be a nominal. But then the ✸ or ✁-approximation rules would be applicable, once again
contradicting the assumption that these rules have been exhaustively applied.
Case 2 is symmetric. 
Theorem 10.11. ALBA succeeds on all inductive inequalities.
Proof. Let s0 ≤ t0 be an (Ω, ϵ)-inductive inequality. By Lemma 10.4, preprocessing s0 ≤ t0 will yield a finite set {si ≤ ti}i∈I
of definite (Ω, ϵ)-inductive inequalities. The execution of the algorithm now branches and proceeds separately on each of
these inequalities. Each s ≤ t ∈ {si ≤ ti}i∈I is replaced with {i ≤ s, t ≤ m}. Notice that i ≤ s and t ≤ m are in definite
(Ω, ϵ)-good shape. Hence, by Proposition 10.10, the system {i ≤ s, t ≤ m} can be transformed, through the application of
the rules of the algorithm, into a set of inequalities in reduced (Ω, ϵ)-Ackermann form. To this set the Ackermann rule can
then be applied to eliminate allΩ-minimal propositional variables.
The Ackermann rule, applied to a set of inequalities in reduced (Ω, ϵ)-Ackermann form, replaces propositional variables
with pure terms; therefore the resulting set of inequalities is in definite (Ω ′, ϵ)-good shape, whereΩ ′ is the restriction ofΩ
to the non-Ω-minimal variables. Indeed, the application of an Ackermann rule turns all ϵ-critical branches corresponding
to Ω-minimal variables into non-critical branches, and leaves the critical branches corresponding to the other variables
unaffected.
Now another cycle of reduction rule applications will lead to a new set of inequalities in reduced (Ω ′, ϵ)-Ackermann
form, from which an application of the Ackermann rule will eliminate all the Ω ′-minimal variables, and so on. Since the
number of variables in s0 ≤ t0 is finite, after a finite number of cycles the algorithmwill output a set of pure inequalities. 
As a corollary of Theorems 8.1, 9.8 and 10.11 we obtain:
Theorem 10.12. All inductive and Sahlqvist inequalities are elementary and canonical.
10.2. ALBA succeeds on all Sahlqvist inequalities
In outline and also in large parts of the detail, proving that ALBA succeeds on Sahlqvist formulas is the same as proving
that it succeeds on inductive inequalities. We will therefore be brief in this section, giving details of proofs only where they
differ from the inductive case.
Definition 10.13 (ϵ-SahlqvistL+ Terms and Inequalities). Given an order type ϵ, the generation tree ∗s, ∗ ∈ {−,+}, of a
term s(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ L+term is ϵ-Sahlqvist if
1. it is ϵ-conservative (cf. Definition 10.1), and
2. on every ϵ-critical branch no choice node has a universal node as ancestor.
An inequality s ≤ t ∈ L+ is ϵ-Sahlqvist if the trees+s and−t are both ϵ-Sahlqvist.
Definition 10.14 (Definite ϵ-SahlqvistL+ Terms and Inequalities). Given an order type ϵ, a signed generation tree ∗s, ∗ ∈
{−,+}, of a term s(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ L+term, is definite ϵ-Sahlqvist if
1. it is ϵ-Sahlqvist,
2. there are no binary choice nodes on any ϵ-critical branch.
An inequality s ≤ t ∈ L is definite ϵ-Sahlqvist if the trees+s and−t are both definite ϵ-Sahlqvist.
Lemma 10.15. Let {si ≤ ti} be the set of inequalities obtained by preprocessing an ϵ-Sahlqvist inequality s ≤ t ∈ L. Then each
si ≤ ti is a definite ϵ-Sahlqvist inequality.
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Proof. Proving that si ≤ ti is an ϵ-Sahlqvist inequality is almost verbatim the same as in the proof of Lemma 10.4 — simply
replace ‘(Ω, ϵ)-inductive’ everywhere with ‘ϵ-Sahlqvist’.
It remains to show that si ≤ ti is definite. Suppose, to the contrary, that in the positive generation tree of si there is a
critical path on which there is a binary choice node, and let n be the closest such node to the root. (Note that since si is ϵ-
conservative, this critical path contains only labels fromL.) If n is the root it must be+∨. Indeed, it cannot be−∧ since we
are considering the positive generation tree. But this cannot be the case, because then the ∨-splitting rule would have been
applied during the preprocessing to eliminate n. Thus, since n is not the root, it must have a parent in the tree, and since si
is ϵ-left Sahlqvist, the parent of the node n (which is a choice node, being+∨ or−∧) must be either the type+✸ or−✄ (in
the case where n is+∨), or of the type−✷ or+✁ (in the case where n is−∧). But once again this leads to a contradiction
with the assumption that pre-preprocessing has been exhaustively performed upon si ≤ ti.
The case for the negative generation tree of ti is similar. 
Definition 10.16 (Definite Good Shape). An inequality s ≤ t ∈ L+ is in definite ϵ-good shape if either of the following
conditions hold:
1. s is pure, +t is definite ϵ-Sahlqvist and moreover, if +t contains a choice node on an ϵ-critical branch, then s is a
nominal.11
2. t is pure, −s is definite ϵ-Sahlqvist and moreover, if −s contains a choice node on an ϵ-critical branch, then t is a co-
nominal.
Since for inequalities s ≤ t in definite ϵ-good shape −s and +t do not contain binary choice nodes on critical branches,
Lemma 10.17 differs from its analogue Lemma 10.6 only in that the case for binary residuation rules does not appear since
these rules are not needed.
Lemma 10.17. If s ≤ t is in definite ϵ-good shape, then any inequality s′ ≤ t ′ obtained from s ≤ t by the application of a splitting
rule, or of an approximation or unary residuation rule top to bottom, is again in definite ϵ-good shape.
Proof. We will only treat the case in which s ≤ t is such that s contains no propositional variables and +t is definite ϵ-
Sahlqvist, the other, in which t contains no propositional variables and−s is definite ϵ-Sahlqvist, being perfectly symmetric.
Which rule is applicable is determined by the root of the positive generation tree of t . If the root is universal, it must be
either+✷ or+✄, i.e. t has the form ✷t ′ or ✄t ′. In the first case the ✷-residuation rule is applicable and yields_s ≤ t ′. Now
clearly_s contains no propositional variables and+t ′ is definite ϵ-Sahlqvist. Since_s is not a nominal, to prove that_s ≤ t ′
is in definite ϵ-good shape, it remains to show that+t ′ contains no unary choice node on an ϵ-critical branch. Indeed, if+t ′
contained such a node, it would imply the existence of a unary choice node on an ϵ-critical branch in +t with a +✷-node
as ancestor, contradicting the assumption that+t is ϵ-Sahlqvist. Hence,_s ≤ t ′ is in definite ϵ-good shape.
In the second case, the inequality has the shape s ≤ ✄t ′, and the ✄-residuation rule is applicable and yields t ′ ≤ Js.
Clearly Js contains no propositional variables. Note that the generation tree of−t ′ is obtained by simply removing the root
from the generation tree of+✄t ′. Hence,−t ′ is definite ϵ-Sahlqvist. Further, as above, we can prove that−t cannot contain
any unary choice node on an ϵ-critical branch. Hence, we conclude that t ′ ≤ Js is in definite ϵ-good shape.
Next, consider the case where the root of+t is a choice node, i.e., it is+∨,+✸ or+✁. Moreover, since s ≤ t is in ϵ-good
shape we must have that s is j for some nominal j. By the assumption of definiteness, the case +∨ cannot occur, and we
have that s ≤ t is either j ≤ ✸t ′ or j ≤ ✁t ′.
In the first case, application of the ✸-approximation rule replaces j ≤ ✸t ′ with the inequalities j ≤ ✸k and k ≤ t ′. It is
immediate that these inequalities are in ϵ-good shape.
In the second case, application of the ✁-approximation rule replaces j ≤ ✁t ′ with the inequalities t ′ ≤ m and j ≤ ✁m.
The latter is trivially in ϵ-good shape. As above, the fact that −t ′ is definite ϵ-Sahlqvist follows from the facts that +✁t ′
is definite ϵ-Sahlqvist and that the generation tree of −t ′ is obtained by deleting the root of the generation tree of +✁t ′.
Hence, t ′ ≤ m is in ϵ-good shape.
Lastly, s ≤ t can be of the form s ≤ t1 ∧ t2, to which the∧-splitting rule applies producing s ≤ t1 and s ≤ t2, for which it
immediate that they are in definite ϵ-good shape. 
Definition 10.18 (ϵ-Ackermann Form). Given a sequence (p1, . . . , pn) of variables and an order type ϵ = (ϵ1, . . . , ϵn), we
will say that a set {si ≤ ti}i∈I of inequalities is in reduced ϵ-Ackermann form if it is in reduced ϵi-Ackermann form with
respect to pi for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (Recall Definition 10.7 where reduced 1-Ackermann form and reduced ∂-Ackermann form
are defined.)
The key difference between Lemma 10.19 below and its analogue Proposition 10.10 is that here no binary residuation rules
are needed. This is why we are able to claim that a strictly weaker version of ALBA is sufficient for handling the Sahlqvist
formulas.
Lemma 10.19. Any finite set {si ≤ ti}i∈I of inequalities which are in definite ϵ-good shape can be transformed into a set
{s′i ≤ t ′i }i∈I ′ which is in reduced ϵ-Ackermann form through the exhaustive application of the splitting, approximation, and unary
residuation rules top to bottom, and only to non-pure inequalities.
11 As in the case of (Ω, ϵ)-good shape, the sides have been swapped around.
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Proof. The proof is the same as that of Proposition 10.10, except for the fact that, since the inequalities in {si ≤ ti}i∈I are in
definite ϵ-good shape (rather that definite (Ω, ϵ)-good shape), there are no binary choice nodes on ϵ-critical paths in the
+t ’s or−s’s, and hence, no binary residuation rules need to be applied. 
Theorem 10.20. The ALBA succeeds on all Sahlqvist inequalities.
Proof. Let s0 ≤ t0 be an ϵ-Sahlqvist inequality. By Lemma 10.15, preprocessing s0 ≤ t0 will yield a finite set {si ≤ ti}i∈I
of definite ϵ-Sahlqvist inequalities. The execution of the algorithm now branches and proceeds separately on each of these
inequalities. Let s ≤ t ∈ {si ≤ ti}i∈I . Firstly, the system {s ≤ t} is replaced with {i ≤ s, t ≤ m}. Notice that i ≤ s and t ≤ m
are in definite ϵ-good shape. Hence, by Lemma 10.19, the set {i ≤ s, t ≤ m} can be transformed, through the application of
the rules of the algorithm, into a set of inequalities in reduced ϵ-Ackermann form. To this set, the Ackermann rule can then
be applied to eliminate all occurring propositional variables simultaneously, which guarantees a successful termination. 
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Appendix
This self-contained appendix is aimed at proving the restricted version of Ackermann lemmas which hold on descriptive
general frames. It is divided into three sections: the first one collects some well-known but useful facts on Priestley spaces
that are applied in the next two sections; the results contained in the second and third ones could have been developed in
a purely algebraic setting but we chose not to do so because these results are then applied in the frame-theoretic setting of
canonicity via correspondence developed in Section 9. However the presentation and proofs of these facts are stated in such
a way that they readily generalize to the purely algebraic setting.
A.1. Priestley spaces
A Priestley space is an ordered topological space X = (X,≤, τ ) that is compact and totally order-disconnected, i.e., such
that, for every x, y ∈ X ,
if x ≰ y then x ∈ U and y /∈ U for some clopen up-set U ⊆ X,
or equivalently,
if x ≰ y then x /∈ U and y ∈ U for some clopen down-set U ⊆ X .
For every Priestley space X, let LX be the collection of the clopen up-sets of X and let DX be the collection of the clopen
down-sets. Let πi : X × X −→ X be the canonical projection over the ith coordinate. Recall that canonical projections are
surjective, continuous and open maps, and, since X× X is compact and X is Hausdorff (see below), they are also closed.
Proposition A.1. For every Priestley space X = (X,≤, τ ),
1. X is Hausdorff, and hence every singleton is closed.
2. The relations≤ and≥ are closed sets in the product space X× X.
3. For every x ∈ X, x↑ and x↓ are closed sets.
4. For every C ⊆ X, if C is closed, then
C↑ =

{U ∈ LX | C ⊆ U} and C↓ =

{V ∈ DX | C ⊆ V }.
Hence, C↑ and C↓ are closed.
5. For every O ⊆ X, if O is an open up-set, then O ={U ∈ LX | U ⊆ O}.
6. For every O ⊆ X, if O is an open down-set, then O ={V ∈ DX | V ⊆ O}.
Proof. 1. If x ≠ y, then either x ≰ y or y ≰ x. In either case, by total order-disconnectedness, there is a disjoint clopen
up-set/clopen down-set pair separating them.
2. If ⟨x, y⟩ /∈ ≤, i.e., x ≰ y, then x ∈ U and y /∈ U for some U ∈ LX, so take U × U c ∈ τX×X : ⟨x, y⟩ ∈ U × U c and
(U × U c) ∩ ≤ = ∅. Similarly≥.
3. Since {x} is closed and π1 is continuous, π−11 [{x}] is closed. Hence, by item 2 above, π−11 [{x}] ∩ ≤ is closed. Therefore,
since π2 is a closed map, x↑ = π2[π−11 [{x}]∩ ≤] is closed.
4. If x /∈ C↑, then y ≰ x for every y ∈ C; hence, by total order-disconnectedness, x ∈ Vy and y /∈ Vy for some Vy ∈ DX.
Therefore, x ∈ y∈C Vy and C ∩ y∈C Vy = ∅. By compactness, C ∩ ni=1 Vyi = ∅ for some yi ∈ C , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let
V = ni=1 Vyi . Clearly, V ∈ DX; hence, V is a down-set, so C ∩ V = ∅ implies that C↑ ∩ V = ∅. Hence, V c ∈ LX, x /∈ V c
and C↑ ⊆ V c , which proves the inclusion from right to left of the first equality. The converse inclusion is immediate. The
second equality is proven in a similar way. The last part of the statement follows from the fact that intersections of clopens
are closed.
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5. If O is an open up-set, then Oc is a closed down-set, i.e., it is of the form C↓ for C = Oc . Hence, the statement follows
from item 4.
6. Similar to 5, using 4. 
The following lemma will also be useful, e.g. in the proof of Lemma A.10.
Lemma A.2. For any Priestley space X = (X,≤, τ ), and any downwards-directed family {Ci}i∈I of closed subsets of X,
1. (

i∈I Ci)↑ =

i∈I(Ci↑) and
2. (

i∈I Ci)↓ =

i∈I(Ci↓).
Proof. We only prove the first claim, the proof of the second one being similar. If x ∈ (i∈I Ci)↑, then y ≤ x for some
y ∈i∈I Ci. But then x ∈ Ci↑ for each i ∈ I; hence, x ∈i∈I(Ci↑).
For the converse implication, assume that x ∉ (i∈I Ci)↑. This is the case iff x↓ ∩ i∈I Ci = ∅. Since x↓ is closed by
Proposition A.1(3), we may appeal to compactness and down-directedness to find a C0 ∈ {Ci}i∈I such that x↓ ∩ C0 = ∅, i.e.,
such that x ∉ C0↑; hence, x ∉i∈I(Ci↑). 
A.2. Topological properties of the modalities and their adjoints
Let us introduce some notation: when the set-theoretic universe is unambiguous, e.g. in a descriptive general frame G,
we will denote the complement of any Y ⊆ W as Y c rather thanW \ Y . We will also denote the collection of clopen up-sets
of XG byA; we will also abuse notation and letAc = {U c | U ∈ A}. To simplify notation, we will also write ✷, ✸, ✄, and ✁,
respectively, for [R✷], ⟨R✸⟩, [R✄⟩, ⟨R✁], and similarly denote the adjoints of these operations with_,,I,J, although we
will use their respective semantic definitions as ⟨R−1✷ ⟩, [R−1✸ ], [R−1✄ ⟩, ⟨R−1✁ ].
Lemma A.3. For every nonempty set W, every binary relation R on W and every Y ⊆ P (W ),
1. [R](Y) ={[R]Y | Y ∈ Y}.
2. ⟨R⟩(Y) ={⟨R⟩Y | Y ∈ Y}.
3. [R⟩(Y) ={[R⟩Y | Y ∈ Y}.
4. ⟨R](Y) ={⟨R]Y | Y ∈ Y}.
Proof. Straightforward. 
Corollary A.4. For every descriptive general frame G = (F , τ ),
1. ✷C is a closed up-set for every closed up-set C.
2. ✸O is a open up-set for every open up-set O.
3. ✄O is a closed up-set for every open up-set O.
4. ✁C is a open up-set for every closed up-set C.
Proof. These facts are straightforward consequences of Lemma A.3. As an illustration, we will give a proof of item 1. By DG1
and Proposition A.1.4, we have C = {U ∈ LXG | C ⊆ U}. Thus, by Lemma A.3.1, we get ✷C = ✷{U ∈ LXG | C ⊆ U} ={✷U | U ∈ LXG and C ⊆ U}. But by DG3, the collectionA = LXG is closed under applications of ✷; hence, ✷C is a closed
up-set. 
The following lemmas are essentially variations on the original Esakia’s lemma [11].
Lemma A.5. For every compact topological spaceX = (W , τ ) and every binary relation R onW such that R[x] is closed for every
x ∈ W, every up-directed collectionU of opens and every down-directed collectionD of closed subsets,
1. [R](U) ={[R]O | O ∈ U}.
2. ⟨R⟩(D) ={⟨R⟩C | C ∈ D}.
3. [R⟩(D) ={[R⟩C | C ∈ D}.
4. ⟨R](U) ={⟨R]O | O ∈ U}.
Proof. 1. The ‘⊇’ inclusion easily follows from the monotonicity of [R]. Conversely, if x ∈ [R](U), then R[x] ⊆ U, so
by compactness, R[x] ⊆ ni=1 Oi for some O1, . . . ,On ∈ U. Since U is up-directed,ni=1 Oi ⊆ O for some O ∈ U. Hence,
x ∈ [R]O ⊆{[R]O | O ∈ U}.
2. The ‘⊆’ inclusion easily follows from the monotonicity of ⟨R⟩. Conversely, if x /∈ ⟨R⟩(D), then R[x] ∩D = ∅, so
by compactness, R[x] ∩ni=1 Ci = ∅ for some C1, . . . , Cn ∈ D . Since D is down-directed, C ⊆ ni=1 Ci for some C ∈ D .
Hence, x /∈ ⟨R⟩C ⊇{⟨R⟩C | C ∈ D}.
3. The ‘⊇’ inclusion easily follows from the antitonicity of [R⟩. Conversely, assume that x ∈ [R⟩(D), which is equivalent
to R[x] ⊆ (D)c ={C c | C ∈ D}. By compactness, R[x] ⊆ni=1 C ci for some C1, . . . , Cn ∈ D . SinceD is down-directed,n
i=1 C
c
i ⊆ C c for some C ∈ D . Hence, x ∈ [R⟩C ⊆
{[R⟩C | C ∈ D}.
4. The ‘⊆’ inclusion easily follows from the antitonicity of ⟨R]. Conversely, assume that x /∈ ⟨R](U), which is equivalent
to∅ = R[x] ∩ (U)c = R[x] ∩{Oc | O ∈ U}. Then, by compactness, R[x] ∩ni=1 Oci = ∅ for some O1, . . . ,On ∈ U. Since
U is up-directed, Oc ⊆ni=1 Oci for some O ∈ U. Hence, x /∈{⟨R]O | O ∈ U}. 
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Corollary A.6. For every descriptive general frame G,
1. ✷O is an open up-set for every open up-set O.
2. ✸C is a closed up-set for every closed up-set C.
3. ✄C is an open up-set for every closed up-set C.
4. ✁O is a closed up-set for every open up-set O.
Proof. 1. By DG1 and Proposition A.1.5, we have O = {U ∈ A | U ⊆ O}. Since the collectionU = {U ∈ A | U ⊆ O} is
clearly up-directed, by Lemma A.5.1 we have ✷O = ✷({U ∈ A | U ⊆ O}) = {✷U | U ∈ A and U ⊆ O}, which, by DG3,
proves the statement.
The proof of the remaining items is similar, using Proposition A.1.4 and Lemma A.5. 
Lemma A.7. For every descriptive general frameG, every up-directed collectionU of XG-open up-sets and every down-directed
collectionD of XG-closed up-sets,
1. (

U) ={O | O ∈ U}.
2. _(

D) ={_C | C ∈ D}.
3. I(

D) ={IC | C ∈ D}.
4. J(

U) ={JO | O ∈ U}.
Proof. 1. The ‘⊇’ inclusion easily follows from the monotonicity of . Conversely, assume that x ∈ (U). Since  is an
operation inP ↑(W ) and

U is an up-set, so is(

U); hence, x ∈ (U) is equivalent to x↑ ⊆ (U). By adjunction,
the latter inclusion is equivalent to✸(x↑) ⊆U. By Proposition A.1.3, x↑ is a closed up-set, so by Corollary A.6.2,✸(x↑) is a
closed up-set. So by compactness,✸(x↑) ⊆ni=1 Oi for some O1, . . . ,On ∈ U. SinceU is up-directed,ni=1 Oi ⊆ O for some
O ∈ U. Hence, ✸(x↑) ⊆ O, which, again by adjunction and O being an up-set, is equivalent to x ∈ O ⊆{O | O ∈ U}.
2. The ‘⊆’ inclusion easily follows from the monotonicity of _. Conversely, assume that x /∈ _(D). SinceD is an
up-set, so is _(

D); hence, x /∈ _(D) is equivalent to x↓ ∩ _(D) = ∅, which is equivalent to _(D) ⊆ x↓c .
By adjunction, the latter inclusion is equivalent to

D ⊆ ✷(x↓c). By Proposition A.1.3, x↓ is a closed down-set, so by
Corollary A.6.1, ✷(x↓c) is an open up-set. So by compactness,ni=1 Ci ⊆ ✷(x↓c) for some C1, . . . , Cn ∈ D . SinceD is down-
directed, C ⊆ni=1 Ci for some C ∈ D . Hence, C ⊆ ✷(x↓c), which, again by adjunction and_C being an up-set, is equivalent
to x /∈ _C ⊇{_C | C ∈ D}.
3. The ‘⊇’ inclusion easily follows from the antitonicity of I. Conversely, assume that x ∈ I(D). SinceD is an up-
set, so is I(

D); hence, x ∈ I(D) is equivalent to x↑ ⊆ I(D). By adjunction, the latter inclusion is equivalent
to

D ⊆ ✄(x↑). By Proposition A.1.3, x↑ is a closed up-set, so by Corollary A.6.3, ✄(x↑) is an open (up-set). So, by
compactness,
n
i=1 Ci ⊆ ✄(x↑) for some C1, . . . , Cn ∈ D . SinceD is down-directed, C ⊆
n
i=1 Ci for some C ∈ D . Hence,
C ⊆ ✄(x↑), which, again by adjunction and IC being an up-set, is equivalent to x ∈ IC ⊆{IC | C ∈ D}.
4. The case for J is similar to (3). 
Notice that in general, the ‘white operations’ are part of a residuated pair only in the perfect extension. Therefore, as
operations, the ‘black operations’ are defined only on P ↑(W ) and not onA. As a consequence of this, an argument similar
to the one that we gave for Corollary A.6, using Lemma A.7, fails to prove the following proposition, and we need to resort
to a different argument, which — as was the case for Corollary A.6 — rests on Lemma A.5.
Proposition A.8. For every descriptive general frame G and every A ⊆ W,
1. O is an open up-set for every open up-set O.
2. _C is a closed up-set for every closed up-set C.
3. IC is an open up-set for every closed up-set C.
4. JO is a closed up-set for every open up-set O.
Proof. 1. Clearly, O ⊇ {U ∈ A | U ⊆ O}; since O is an up-set and  is an operation in P ↑(W ), we have that O is
an up-set. So to prove the statement it is enough to show the converse inclusion to the one above, i.e., that if x ∈ O, then
x ∈ U for some U ∈ A such that U ⊆ O. Since O is an up-set, x ∈ O is equivalent to x↑ ⊆ O, which by adjunction
is equivalent to ✸(x↑) ⊆ O. By Proposition A.1.3, x↑ is a closed up-set; hence, by Proposition A.1.4 and Lemma A.5.2,
✸(x↑) = {✸U | U ∈ A and x↑ ⊆ U}. Now observe that ✸U ∈ A, so in particular ✸U is a closed (up-set), and O is
an open up-set; hence we may apply compactness and get that
n
i=1 ✸Ui ⊆ O for some Ui ∈ A s.t. x↑ ⊆ Ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let
U =ni=1 Ui. Clearly, x↑ ⊆ U , i.e., x ∈ U; moreover, by the monotonicity of ✸, we have ✸U ⊆ni=1 ✸Ui ⊆ O, and hence, by
adjunction, U ⊆ O.
2. Clearly, _C ⊆ {U ∈ A | _C ⊆ U}; since C is an up-set and _ is an operation in P ↑(W ), we have that _C is an
up-set. So to prove the statement it is enough to show the converse inclusion to the one above, i.e., that if x /∈ _C , then
x /∈ U for some U ∈ A such that_C ⊆ U . Since_C is an up-set, x /∈ _C is equivalent to x↓ ∩_C = ∅, which is equivalent
to _C ⊆ x↓c , which, by adjunction, is equivalent to C ⊆ ✷(x↓c). By Proposition A.1.3, x↓c is an open up-set; hence, by
Proposition A.1.5 and Lemma A.5.1, ✷(x↓c) = {✷U | U ∈ A and U ⊆ x↓c}. Now observe that ✷U ∈ A, so in particular
✷U is an open (up-set), and C is a closed up-set; hence we may apply compactness and get that C ⊆ ni=1 ✷Ui for some
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Ui ∈ A s.t. Ui ⊆ x↓c , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let U =ni=1 Ui. Clearly, U ⊆ x↓c , i.e., x /∈ U; moreover, by the monotonicity of ✷, we have
C ⊆ni=1 ✷Ui ⊆ ✷U , and hence, by adjunction,_C ⊆ U .
3. This is similar to (4) below.
4. Clearly, JO ⊆ {U ∈ A | JO ⊆ U}; since O is an up-set and J is an operation in P ↑(W ), we have that JO is an
up-set. So, to prove the statement, it is enough to show the converse inclusion to the one above, i.e., that if x /∈ JO, then
x /∈ U for some U ∈ A such that JO ⊆ U . Since JO is an up-set, x /∈ JO is equivalent to x↓ ∩ JO = ∅, which is equivalent
to JO ⊆ x↓c , which, by adjunction, is equivalent to ✁(x↓c) ⊆ O. By Proposition A.1.3, x↓c is an open up-set; hence, by
Proposition A.1.5 and Lemma A.5.4, ✁(x↓c) = {✁U | U ∈ A and U ⊆ x↓c}. Now observe that ✁U ∈ A, so in particular
✁U is a closed (up-set), and O is an open up-set; hence we may apply compactness and get that
n
i=1 ✁Ui ⊆ O for some
Ui ∈ A s.t. Ui ⊆ x↓c , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let U = ni=1 Ui. Clearly, U ⊆ x↓c , i.e., x /∈ U; moreover, by the antitonicity of ✁, we have
✁U ⊆ni=1 ✁Ui ⊆ O, and hence, by adjunction, JO ⊆ U . 
A.3. Proof of the Ackermann lemmas for descriptive frames (Lemmas 9.3 and 9.4)
Fix a descriptive general frame G = (W ,≤, R✸, R✷, R✁, R✄, τ ), and let G♯ = (W ,≤, R✸, R✷, R✁, R✄) be the underlying
DML frame of G. Recall the notation ϕVp (X) from Section 2.5.1 and the notions of syntactic open and closed formulas from
Definition 9.2.
Lemma A.9. Let ϕ be syntactically closed andψ syntactically open. Let V be an admissible valuation, C be a closed up-set and O
be an open up-set. Then,
1. (a) if ϕ(p) positive in p, then ϕVp (C) is a closed up-set, and
(b) if ψ(p) negative in p, then ψVp (C) is an open up-set;
2. (a) if ϕ(p) negative in p, then ϕVp (O) is a closed up-set, and
(b) if ψ(p) positive in p, then ψVp (O) is an open up-set.
Proof. We prove (1) by simultaneous induction of ϕ and ψ . Assume that ϕ(p) is positive in p and that ψ(p) negative in p.
The base cases of the induction are those when ϕ is of the form ⊤, ⊥, p, q (for propositional variables q different from p),
or i, and when ψ is of the form ⊤, ⊥, q (for propositional variables q different from p), or m. (Note that the ϕ cannot be a
co-nominalm, since it is syntactically closed. Also,ψ cannot be p or a nominal i, since is negative in p and syntactically open,
respectively.) These cases follow on noting (1) that V [p := C](⊥) = ∅, V [p := C](⊤) = W , and V [p := C](q) = V (q) are
all clopen up-sets, (2) that V [p := C](p) = C and V [p := C](i) = x↑ are closed up-sets, and (3) that V [p := C](m) = (x↓)c
is an open up-set.
For the remainder of the proof, we will not need to refer to the valuation V and will hence omit reference to it. We will
accordingly write ϕ and ψ for ϕVp and ψ
V
p , respectively.
In the cases ϕ(p) = ϕ1(p) ∨ ϕ2(p) or ϕ(p) = ϕ1(p) ∧ ϕ2(p), both ϕ1(p) and ϕ2(p) are syntactically closed and positive
in p; hence the claim follows by the inductive hypothesis and the fact that finite unions and intersections of closed up-sets
are closed up-sets.
Similarly, if ψ(p) = ψ1(p) ∨ ψ2(p) or ψ(p) = ψ1(p) ∧ ψ2(p), then both ψ1(p) and ψ2(p) are syntactically open and
negative in p; hence the claim follows by the inductive hypothesis and the fact that finite unions and intersections of open
up-sets are open up-sets.
If ϕ(p) = ϕ1(p)−ϕ2(p), then ϕ1(p) is syntactically closed and positive in p, while ϕ2(p) is syntactically open and negative
in p. Thus, by the inductive hypothesis, ϕ1(C) is a closed up-set, while ϕ2(C) is an open up-set. Now ϕ1(C) − ϕ2(C) =
(ϕ1(C) ∩ (ϕ2(C))c)↑ (see Section 2.5.1), but ϕ1(C) ∩ (ϕ2(C))c is closed, so, by Proposition A.1.4, (ϕ1(C) ∩ (ϕ2(C))c)↑ is a
closed up-set.
If ψ(p) = ψ1(p) → ψ2(p), then ψ1(p) is syntactically closed and positive in p, while ψ2(p) is syntactically open
and negative in p. Thus, by the inductive hypothesis, ψ1(C) is a closed up-set, while ψ2(C) is an open up-set. Now
ψ1(C)→ ψ2(C) = (ψ1(C) ∩ (ψ2(C))c)↓)c (see Section 2.5.1). Then ψ1(C) ∩ (ψ2(C))c is closed, and, by Proposition A.1.4,
(ψ1(C) ∩ (ψ2(C))c)↓ is a closed down-set, so ((ψ1(C) ∩ (ψ2(C))c)↓)c is an open up-set.
Thus, only the cases for the unary connectives remain. Notice that the cases when ϕ is of the form ϕ1 or Iϕ1 do not
occur, since these formulas are not syntactically closed. Nor do the cases when ψ is of the form _ψ1 or Jψ1 occur, since
these formulas are not syntactically open.
If ϕ(p) is of the form ✷ϕ1(p), ✸ϕ1(p), or_ϕ1(p), then ϕ1(p)must be syntactically closed and positive in p, and hence the
claim follows by the inductive hypothesis and Corollary A.4.1, Corollary A.6.2, and Proposition A.8.2, respectively.
Similarly, ifψ(p) is of the form ✷ψ1(p),✸ψ1(p), orψ1(p), thenψ1(p)must be syntactically open and negative in p, and
hence the claim follows by the inductive hypothesis, Corollary A.6.1, Corollary A.4.2, and Proposition A.8.1, respectively.
If ϕ(p) is of the form ✁ϕ1(p), ✄ϕ1(p), or Jϕ1(p), then it must be the case that ϕ1(p) is syntactically open and negative
in p. It follows by the inductive hypothesis that ϕ1(C) is an open up-set, and hence, by Corollary A.6.4, Corollary A.4.3, and
Proposition A.8.4, respectively, that ϕ(C) is a closed up-set, as desired.
Lastly, if ψ(p) is of the form ✁ψ1(p), ✄ψ1(p), or Iψ1(p), then it must be the case that ψ1(p) is syntactically closed and
positive in p. It followsby the inductive hypothesis thatψ1(C) is a closedup-set, andhence, by CorollaryA.4.4, CorollaryA.6.3,
and Proposition A.8.3, respectively, that ψ(C) is an open up-set, as desired.
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Item (2) can similarly be proved by simultaneous induction on negative ϕ and positiveψ . In fact, the induction is almost
verbatim the same, except that
• the base cases are those when ϕ is of the form⊤,⊥, q (for propositional variables q different from p) or i, and whenψ is
of the form⊤,⊥, p, q (for propositional variables q different from p), orm, and
• C is uniformly replaced with O. 
Lemma A.10. Let ϕ(p) be syntactically closed,ψ(p) be syntactically open, V be an admissible valuation, {Ci}i∈I be a downward-
directed family of closed up-sets, and {Oi}i∈I be a upward-directed family of open up-sets. Then,
1. (a) if ϕ(p) is positive in p, then ϕVp (

i∈I Ci) =

i∈I ϕVp (Ci), and
(b) if ψ(p) is negative in p, then ψVp (

i∈I Ci) =

i∈I ψVp (Ci);
2. (a) if ϕ(p) is negative in p, then ϕVp (

i∈I Oi) =

i∈I ϕVp (Oi), and
(b) if ψ(p) is positive in p, then ψVp (

i∈I Oi) =

i∈I ψVp (Oi).
Proof. We prove (1) by simultaneous induction on ϕ and ψ . The base cases of the induction on ϕ are those when ϕ is of
the form⊤,⊥, p, a propositional variable q other than p, or i; the base cases for ψ are those when ψ is of the form⊤,⊥, a
propositional variable q other than p, orm. In each of these cases the claim is trivial.
For the remainder of the proof, we will omit reference to the valuation V , and simply write ϕ and ψ for ϕVp and ψ
V
p ,
respectively.
In the cases where ϕ(p) = ϕ1(p)∧ ϕ2(p), ϕ(p) = ϕ1(p)∨ ϕ2(p),ψ(p) = ψ1(p)∨ψ2(p) andψ(p) = ψ1(p)∧ψ2(p), we
have that ϕ1 and ϕ2 are syntactically closed and positive in p and that ψ1 and ψ2 are syntactically open and negative in p.
Hence, when ϕ(p) = ϕ1(p)∧ ϕ2(p) and whenψ(p) = ψ1(p)∨ψ2(p) the claim follows by the inductive hypothesis and
the associativity of, respectively, intersection and union of sets.
If ϕ(p) = ϕ1(p) ∨ ϕ2(p), then, by the inductive hypothesis,
ϕ

i∈I
Ci

= ϕ1

i∈I
Ci

∪ ϕ2

i∈I
Ci

=

i∈I
ϕ1(Ci) ∪

i∈I
ϕ2(Ci).
We thus have to show that

i∈I ϕ1(Ci)∪

i∈I ϕ2(Ci) =

i∈I(ϕ1(Ci)∪ϕ2(Ci)). The inclusion from left to right is immediate. To
consider the converse, let x ∉i∈I ϕ1(Ci)∪i∈I ϕ2(Ci). Thus, there exist C1, C2 ∈ {Ci}i∈I such that x ∉ ϕ1(C1) and x ∉ ϕ2(C2).
By the downward-directedness of {Ci}i∈I , we have that C0 ⊆ C1 ∩ C2 for some C0 ∈ {Ci}i∈I ; hence, by the monotonicity of ϕ1
and ϕ2, we get that x ∉ ϕ1(C0) and x ∉ ϕ2(C0). Therefore, x ∉ ϕ1(C0)∪ ϕ2(C0), and consequently, x ∉i∈I(ϕ1(Ci)∪ ϕ2(Ci)).
Next, if ψ(p) = ψ1(p) ∧ ψ2(p), then, by the inductive hypothesis,
ψ

i∈I
Ci

= ψ1

i∈I
Ci

∩ ψ2

i∈I
Ci

=

i∈I
ψ1(Ci) ∩

i∈I
ψ2(Ci).
We thus have to show that

i∈I ψ1(Ci)∩

i∈I ψ2(Ci) =

i∈I(ψ1(Ci)∩ψ2(Ci)). The inclusion from right to left is immediate.
To prove the converse, let x ∈ i∈I ψ1(Ci) ∩ i∈I ψ2(Ci). Thus, there exist C1, C2 ∈ {Ci}i∈I such that x ∈ ψ1(C1) and
x ∈ ψ2(C2). By the downward-directedness of {Ci}i∈I , we have that C0 ⊆ C1 ∩ C2 for some C0 ∈ {Ci}i∈I . Hence, by the
antitonicity of ψ1 and ψ2, we get that x ∈ ψ1(C0) and x ∈ ψ2(C0). Therefore, x ∈ ψ1(C0) ∩ ψ2(C0), and consequently,
x ∈i∈I(ψ1(Ci) ∩ ψ2(Ci)).
If ϕ(p) = ϕ1(p) − ϕ2(p), then ϕ1(p) is syntactically closed and positive in p, while ϕ2(p) is syntactically open and
negative in p. Thus, by the inductive hypothesis, ϕ1(

i∈I Ci) − ϕ2(

i∈I Ci) =

i∈I ϕ1(Ci) −

i∈I ϕ2(Ci). The latter is
equal to [i∈I ϕ1(Ci) ∩ (i∈I ϕ2(Ci))c]↑, which is the same as [i∈I ϕ1(Ci) ∩ i∈I(ϕ2(Ci))c]↑. By the associativity and
commutativity of ∩, the latter set can be rewritten as [{ϕ1(Ci) ∩ (ϕ2(Ci))c | i ∈ I}]↑. Since ϕ1(p) ∩ (ϕ2(p))c is monotone
in p, it follows from the downward-directedness of {Ci}i∈I that {ϕ1(Ci) ∩ (ϕ2(Ci))c | i ∈ I} is a downward-directed
family of (by Lemma A.9) closed sets. Finally, by Lemma A.2.1, we have that [{ϕ1(Ci) ∩ (ϕ2(Ci))c | i ∈ I}]↑ is equal to{[ϕ1(Ci) ∩ (ϕ2(Ci))c]↑ | i ∈ I} ={ϕ1(Ci)− ϕ2(Ci) | i ∈ I}.
If ψ(p) = ψ1(p) → ψ2(p), then ψ1(p) is syntactically closed and positive in p, while ψ2(p) is syntactically open and
negative in p. Thus, by the inductive hypothesis, ψ1(

i∈I Ci) → ψ2(

i∈I Ci) =

i∈I ψ1(Ci) →

i∈I ψ2(Ci). The latter is
equal to [i∈I ψ1(Ci)∩ (i∈I ψ2(Ci))c]↓c , which in turn is equal to [i∈I ψ1(Ci)∩i∈I(ψ2(Ci))c]↓c . By the associativity and
commutativity of ∩, the latter is equal to [{ψ1(Ci) ∩ (ψ2(Ci))c | i ∈ I}]↓c . As in the previous case, since ψ1(p) ∩ (ψ2(p))c
is monotone in p, it follows from the downward-directedness of {Ci}i∈I that {ψ1(Ci) ∩ (ψ2(Ci))c | i ∈ I} is a downward-
directed family of (by Lemma A.9) closed sets. Now, by Lemma A.2.2, [{ψ1(Ci) ∩ (ψ2(Ci))c | i ∈ I}]↓c is equal to
[{(ψ1(Ci)∩(ψ2(Ci))c)↓ | i ∈ I}]c , which is again equal to{(ψ1(Ci)∩(ψ2(Ci))c)↓c | i ∈ I} ={ψ1(Ci)→ ψ2(Ci) | i ∈ I}.
If ϕ(p) is of the form ⊙ϕ1(p) for ⊙ ∈ {✷,✸,_}, then ϕ1(p)must be syntactically closed and positive in p. Then, by the
inductive hypothesis, ϕ1(

i∈I Ci) =

i∈I ϕ1(Ci). By Lemma A.9, ϕ1(Ci) is a closed up-set for each i ∈ I . Moreover, by the
monotonicity of ϕ1 and the downward-directedness of {Ci}i∈I , the family {ϕ1(Ci)}i∈I is downward-directed. We may hence
apply Lemma A.3.1, A.5.2, and A.7.2, respectively, to conclude that⊙(i∈I ϕ1(Ci)) =i∈I ⊙ϕ1(Ci) for all⊙ ∈ {✷,✸,_}.
If ψ(p) is of the form⊙ψ1(p) for⊙ ∈ {✷,✸,}, then ψ1(p)must be syntactically open and negative in p. Then, by the
inductive hypothesis, ψ1(

i∈I Ci) =

i∈I ψ1(Ci). By Lemma A.9, ψ1(Ci) is an open up-set for each i ∈ I . Moreover, by the
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antitonicity ofψ1 and the downward-directedness of {Ci}i∈I , the family {ϕ1(Ci)}i∈I is upward-directed. Wemay hence apply
Lemma A.5.1, A.3.2, and A.7.1, respectively, to conclude that⊙(i∈I ψ1(Ci)) =i∈I ⊙ψ1(Ci) for all⊙ ∈ {✷,✸,}.
If ϕ(p) is of the form ⊙ϕ1(p) for ⊙ ∈ {✁,✄,J}, then ϕ1(p) must be syntactically open and negative in p. Then, by the
inductive hypothesis, ϕ1(

i∈I Ci) =

i∈I ϕ1(Ci). By Lemma A.9, ϕ1(Ci) is a open up-set for each i ∈ I . Moreover, by the
antitonicity of ϕ1 and the downward-directedness of {Ci}i∈I , the family {ϕ1(Ci)}i∈I is upward-directed. We may hence apply
Lemma A.5.4, A.3.3, and A.7.4, respectively, to conclude that⊙(i∈I ϕ1(Ci)) =i∈I ⊙ϕ1(Ci) for all⊙ ∈ {✁,✄,J}.
If ψ(p) is of the form⊙ψ1(p) for⊙ ∈ {✁,✄,I}, then ψ1(p)must be syntactically closed and positive in p. Then, by the
inductive hypothesis, ψ1(

i∈I Ci) =

i∈I ψ1(Ci). By Lemma A.9, ψ1(Ci) is a closed up-set for each i ∈ I . Moreover, by the
monotonicity of ψ1 and the downward-directedness of {Ci}i∈I , the family {ϕ1(Ci)}i∈I is downward-directed. We may hence
apply Lemma A.3.4, A.5.3, and A.7.3, respectively, to conclude that⊙(i∈I ψ1(Ci)) =i∈I ⊙ψ1(Ci) for all⊙ ∈ {✁,✄,I}.
Thus, the proof of item (1) is concluded. Items (2) can be proved similarly by simultaneous induction on ϕ negative in p
and ψ positive in p. 
Proof of Lemma 9.3. To keep the notation uncluttered, we will simply write βi and γi for βiVp and γi
V
p , respectively. The
implication frombottom to top follows from themonotonicity of theβi and the antitonicity of the γi in p. Indeed, ifα(V ) ≤ P ,
then βi(α(V )) ≤ βi(P) ≤ γi(P) ≤ γi(α(V )) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
To consider the converse implication, assume that βi(α(V )) ≤ γi(α(V )) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By Lemma A.9, α(V ) is a closed
up-set. Hence, by Proposition A.1.4, α(V ) = {U ∈ A | α(V ) ⊆ U}, making it the intersection of a down-directed family
of closed up-sets. Thus, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have
βi

{U ∈ A | α(V ) ⊆ U}

≤ γi

{U ∈ A | α(V ) ⊆ U}

.
Since βi is syntactically closed and positive in p, and γi is syntactically open and negative in p, we may apply Lemma A.10 to
obtain
{βi(U) |∈ A, α(V ) ⊆ U}) ⊆

{γi(U) | U ∈ A, α(V ) ⊆ U}.
By Lemma A.9, βi(U) is closed and γi(U) is open for each U ∈ A. Hence, by compactness,
m′
h=1
βi(Uh) ⊆
n
j=1
γi(Uj) (26)
for someU1, . . . ,Um ∈ Awithα(V ) ⊆ Uj for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and someU ′1, . . . ,U ′m′ ∈ A such thatα(V ) ⊆ U ′h for all 1 ≤ h ≤ m′.
Let Bi = U ′1 ∩ · · · ∩ U ′m′ ∩ U1 ∩ · · · ∩ Um. Then α(V ) ⊆ Bi ∈ A. By the monotonicity of βi, the antitonicity of γi, and (26), it
follows that
βi(Bi) ≤ γi(Bi). (27)
Now, letting P = B1 ∩ · · · ∩ Bn, we have α(V ) ⊆ P ∈ A. Again by the monotonicity of the βi, the antitonicity of the γi, and
(27), we get that
βi(P) ≤ γi(P) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof of Lemma 9.4. As before, we will write βi and γi for βiVp and γi
V
p , respectively. The implication from bottom to top
follows from the antitonicity of the βi and the monotonicity of the γi.
To prove the converse implication, assume that βiVp (α(V )) ≤ γiVp (α(V )) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. But α is syntactically open and
(trivially) negative in p; hence, by Lemma A.9.2, α(V ) is an open up-set, i.e., α(V ) = {U ∈ A | U ⊆ α(V )}. Thus, for any
1 ≤ i ≤ n, it is the case that
βi

{U ∈ A | U ⊆ α(V )}

≤ γi

{U ∈ A | U ⊆ α(V )}

.
Hence, by Lemma A.10,
{βi(U) | U ∈ A, U ⊆ α(V )} ≤

{γi(U) | U ∈ A, U ⊆ α(V )}.
The proof now proceeds like that of Lemma 9.3.
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